# MISCONDUCT/ SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND ABUSE RISK MANAGEMENT TOOLKIT

Guide for practitioners to managing risks of misconduct, including sexual exploitation and abuse, in United Nations Secretariat entities

**DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT STRATEGY, POLICY AND COMPLIANCE**

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

# FOREWORD

The work of the United Nations is grounded in its values and supported by a global workforce of uniformed and civilian personnel who are expected to abide by the highest standards of conduct. It is, however, our obligation to understand and respond to the risk of misconduct across the United Nations' Secretariat, whether in peace operations, field or regional offices, or headquarters locations. My department has oversight over the conduct and discipline function across the global Secretariat and this guidance is intended for use by all United Nations' Secretariat entities to ensure an integrated and consistent approach to misconduct risk management.

Misconduct does not happen in a vacuum and managing its risks requires a fully integrated approach. An important part of planning and risk management on conduct and discipline issues will be to understand why misconduct happens, and the complex interconnection between the factors that drive misconduct. When conducting planning and risk management on misconduct issues, it will be key to reach out to others and ensure that tackling misconduct is done in a holistic way that also reinforces other UN reform priorities, particularly achieving gender parity. Effective risk management calls for an all-hands-on-deck approach. While this guidance is aimed particularly at conduct and discipline practitioners, key stakeholders within and outside each mission or entity need to be involved to paint a full picture of risks and how to address them.

This guidance, updated since its initial publication in 2018, provides a set of practical tools to help the global Secretariat plan and manage risks relating to conduct and discipline issues, including sexual exploitation and abuse. The guidance and its underlying methodology and tools have become part of the bloodstream of the global Secretariat and are in active use across missions and entities.



Catherine Pollard, Under Secretary-General for Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance. (Photo: Department of Global Communications)

Risks of misconduct include the most serious - sexual exploitation and abuse and sexual harassment in the workplace, which can inflict irreparable harm on the rights and dignity of victims. When conducting planning and risk management on conduct and discipline issues, I urge users of this guidance to see every step of the misconduct risk management process from the perspective that this must be a collective, integrated effort that forms part of our daily work.

## Catherine Pollard

**Under Secretary-General for
Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance**

# ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This guidance was published in August 2024 and a pdf version is available on-line at: https://conduct.unmissions.org.

Practitioners can also access this Toolkit, including links and digital resources, on Sharepoint.

Conduct and Discipline Teams and Focal Points may request access to the online resources by emailing cds-ohr@un.org.

# ACRONYMS, ABBREVIATIONS AND TERMINOLOGY

**CBCM:** Community-Based Complaint Mechanism or Community-Based Complaint Networks

**CDT**: Conduct and Discipline Team

**CDFP**: Conduct and Discipline Focal Point

**CMTS**: Case Management Tracking System

**DMSPC:** Department of Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance

**ERM**: Enterprise Risk Management

**OVRA**: Office of the Victims' Rights Advocate

**OIOS**: Office of Internal Oversight Services

**Peace Operations:** Peacekeeping Missions and/or Special Political Missions

**PCC**: Police-contributing Country

**PSEA**: Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse

**SEA**: Sexual Exploitation and Abuse

**SVRO**: Senior Victims' Rights Officer

**TCC**: Troop-contributing Country

**UN**: United Nations

**UNPOL**: UN Police

**UN Secretariat Entities**: All entities in the UN global Secretariat, including peacekeeping missions and special political missions

MINUSCA community outreach (Photo: UN/MINUSCA)

# PART 1:
# KEY CONCEPTS ON
# MISCONDUCT RISK MANAGEMENT

# OVERVIEW

The vast majority of United Nations personnel serve with integrity and respect and are role models for the United Nation's standards of conduct. The United Nations Secretariat recognizes, however, that we must operate with the perspective that there is an ever-present risk of misconduct in our operations across the global Secretariat, including in field operations. Risks of misconduct, which can include SEA, sexual harassment, abuse of authority, fraud and other types of misconduct, can implicate military, police, and civilian personnel. The Organization has a duty to manage these risks to optimize prevention measures, ensure accountability for violations, and to place the rights and dignity of victims at the center of our prevention and response to SEA and sexual harassment.

## 1. Planning and risk management of misconduct

Planning and risk management on issues of conduct and discipline are core leadership and management functions. Risk management can help the global Secretariat to be more effective in preventing and addressing misconduct in four ways.

1. Risk management supports better decision-making on conduct and discipline issues. By understanding which forms of misconduct their personnel are more likely to engage in and why, UN entities can take more informed decisions about how to prevent misconduct.
2. Risk management enables organizations to be more pro-active in how they address misconduct. By anticipating threats and gathering information that can allow for a proactive posture, UN Secretariat Entities can take actions now to reduce those future threats or even avoid them altogether.
3. Risk management provides a concrete way to integrate UN Secretariat entities, components, and members of the United Nations Country Team, beyond conduct and discipline practitioners, into a better understanding and ownership over misconduct risk management.
4. Risk management is a critical tool to hold leaders, managers, and commanders to account, by clearly identifying who is responsible for addressing specific risks, what actions they must take and by when.

## 2. Use of this toolkit to help my UN Secretariat entity

This toolkit can help your UN Secretariat Entity develop an annual **workplan and risk register on misconduct issues**. The workplan describes how your UN Secretariat Entity will prevent misconduct by its personnel, enforce UN standards of conduct when misconduct occurs (e.g. through investigations) and provide support to victims of SEA and sexual harassment. The risk register describes the main risks to the successful achievement of this workplan and how these risks will be mitigated and managed.

## 3. Useful for all types of misconduct, including SEA

This toolkit can be used to manage the risks of all types of misconduct, including SEA. SEA, however, is considered a **high priority risk across the global Secretariat** and there should be a dedicated section in the risk register and workplan that specifically addresses managing this risk.

All UN entities are required to produce a yearly Action Plan describing how they will prevent and respond to SEA. Information from this SEA Action Plan must be aligned to this broader workplan and risk register covering all forms of misconduct.

# 4. To be used by all entities within the global Secretariat

This guidance is for all entities within the global Secretariat, whether operating in the field or a headquarters setting. In the field, it can be used, for example, by UN peace operations, special political missions, and regional political offices. In non-field operation settings, it can be used, for example, by departments and offices of the UN Secretariat, offices away from headquarters, regional commissions, and regional tribunals.

# 5. Useful for a small office where misconduct allegations are limited

In all UN entities, senior leadership and management need to put in place risk prevention measures to ensure that UN personnel respect the highest standards of conduct. Even in locations where few allegations are reported, misconduct may be happening. It is also a requirement of the Secretary-General that every entity specifically have a plan in place to manage the risk of SEA.

In an entity where historically there have been few incidents of misconduct and there are few, if any, staff dedicated to conduct and discipline issues, a "light touch approach" may be preferable. In such situations, it may be enough to focus on two key misconduct risk management tools: a workplan on misconduct issues that consists of a logframe only (using Tool 2) as well as a risk register (using Tool 1). In UN entities, including field operations facing a higher risk of misconduct, a comprehensive workplan and risk register is likely to be more appropriate, using all five tools provided in this toolkit.

# 6. Consider whether to develop a workplan and risk register covering all forms of misconduct instead of one focused entirely on SEA

In some country settings, the risk of UN personnel engaging in SEA is lower and there have been few or no incidents in the past. Instead, other forms of misconduct are more likely to occur and are more prevalent such as sexual harassment, abuse of authority, fraud, and theft. In such situations, it is useful to have a broad workplan and risk register that covers all forms of misconduct, including SEA. A broader misconduct workplan also allows the UN Secretariat Entity to better identify linkages between risk factors (e.g. between those for SEA and sexual harassment) and tackle them holistically.

# 7. Users of this toolkit

The primary users (hereafter referred to as "users") are conduct and discipline experts/focal points (in field operation settings) and personnel who have been designated as CDFPs (in non-field operation settings) who provide day-to-day advice and support to senior management and leadership on how to discharge their responsibilities on conduct and discipline matters.

In field operation settings, the SVRO, where present, and the PSEA Networks will also be key collaborators and users of the toolkit with respect to SEA risk management. PSEA Networks support Humanitarian Coordinators to put in place effective systems to prevent and respond to SEA by humanitarian workers.

Users should follow the risk management process described in part 2 of the guidance to develop a risk register. Part 2 provides a simplified risk management process and is adapted to cover all forms of misconduct in field and non-field operation settings. This risk management process is aligned with the UN's ERM policy and guidelines (2018).

# 8. Tools can be tailored to all entities' context and needs

Users are encouraged to adapt the tools in this toolkit to their context and needs. The sample workplan and risk register contains examples of workplan activities and misconduct risks for a field operation setting. In other settings, other misconduct risks may arise such as the risk of UN personnel engaging in unauthorized outside activities (e.g. unauthorized teaching at a local university) or failure to honour private legal obligations (e.g. failure to pay rent or child support payments) as well as risks relating to misconduct by implementing partners (e.g. fraud or misuse of project funds). Users will need to conduct their own risk analysis to identify specific risks for their organization and context.

# KEY CONCEPTS ON RISK MANAGEMENT

## Risks

**A risk is an uncertain event in the future that, if it happens, would affect the achievement of the UN entity's objectives**. Although risks can also be positive opportunities that enhance the achievement of the UN's efforts to uphold UN standards of conduct, this guidance will focus on risks that are negative threats that would harm the successful achievement of the UN entity's objectives on misconduct.

Typically, UN entities have three key objectives on misconduct.

- **Objective 1**: To prevent misconduct by UN personnel
- **Objective 2**: To enforce UN standards of conduct of misconduct (e.g. by investigating allegations of misconduct)
- **Objective 3**: To assist victims of misconduct by UN personnel, with full respect for their rights and dignity

**A risk is an event that may or may not happen.** For example, a common challenge facing some misconduct investigations in the past has been the difficulty to substantiate what appears to be a credible allegation because evidence has been unavailable or difficult to authenticate. Some investigations will most likely suffer from this problem again in the future, but this is not certain to be the case in all future investigations. "The evidence in misconduct cases is unavailable or difficult to authenticate" is therefore a risk because it is an uncertain event in the future that would harm the achievement of the UN entity's objective of enforcing UN standards of conduct when misconduct occurs (objective 2).

**A risk is often confused with its cause or its consequence.** A risk has 1 or more causes: these causes are also known as "risk factors". For example, the evidence in misconduct cases is sometimes unavailable or difficult to authenticate because it may have been improperly collected and contaminated in the process, witnesses may have moved away and cannot be traced, and investigators may not have the specialist skills required to conduct that specific type of investigation. It is important to understand these risk factors, or causes, since it may be possible to address some of these causes and thus reduce the likelihood of this risk happening.

> ### 💡 Definition of risk
>
> Risk is the effect of uncertainty on objectives.
>
> *Source: ISO 31000: Risk Management (2018), International Organization for Standardization.*

**A risk also has one or more consequences.** For example, the risk that evidence in misconduct cases is unavailable or difficult to authenticate would make it difficult to substantiate the allegation, which in turn would result in impunity for perpetrators, further trauma and harm to victims or witnesses, a perception of a UN cover-up and damage to the UN's credibility and mandate/programme implementation. Again, it is important to understand the consequences of the risks, as these may also need to be addressed. For example, to minimize public perception of a UN cover-up in future investigations where the evidence was difficult to authenticate, the UN entity might need to conduct external communications activities now to explain the process of an investigation and its challenges.

# Role of leadership in managing risks of misconduct/SEA

Leadership is accountable for the conduct and discipline of those under their supervision and authority. In practical terms, the head of a UN Secretariat entity will have accountability for conduct and discipline, which will also be reflected in their Compact with the Secretary-General, although all members of the leadership team, as well as all managers and commanders at all levels, have responsibility for managing the risks of misconduct, and particularly **SEA which is a high risk for victims, communities and the Organization, and a key area of leadership accountability**. Every field operation must have a standing mechanism (such as the SEA Task Force) where leadership regularly reviews misconduct risk management issues and takes informed decisions. Emerging misconduct/SEA risks of concern should be discussed at Senior Mission Leadership meetings without waiting for the standing mechanism to meet. At the mid-management level, management retreats, contingent commander conferences and weekly police component briefings are useful fora to discuss whether SEA risks affecting their personnel are changing and to discuss how best to address them. SEA risks that may have impact on the safety and security of UN personnel should also be considered by the Security Management Team during the UN Security Risk Management process. Misconduct/SEA risks that appear on the field operation's risk register should also be discussed in the regular Risk Management Committee meetings to ensure an integrated approach.

**LEADERSHIP CHECKLIST**



UNIFIL peacekeepers at the ceremony to commemorate International Day of Peacekeepers at Naquora UNIFIL Headquarters, in South Lebanon. (Photo: Pasqual Gorriz UN)

Department of Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance

# Integrated risk management

Risk management is the process of identifying, assessing, treating, and monitoring risks to the UN entity's successful achievement of its objectives. Misconduct risk management is best done as a team effort: developing a risk register and workplan must involve all relevant parts of the UN entity as well as consultations with other UN entities operating in the same country(ies). While CDTs and/or focal points are the main users of this toolkit and have a coordination role, the misconduct risk management process must be understood to be a collective effort and responsibility.

It is imperative that risk management is integrated throughout the entire field operation or other UN entity setting. In a field operation this will generally involve stakeholders such as: senior leadership, the CDT, the Force, the Police Component, Mission Support, and other relevant mission components (such as SVRO, safety and security, gender-based violence and child protection clusters, etc.). In non-field operation settings, this will generally involve stakeholders such as: senior leadership and human resources, as well as conduct and discipline and/or victims' rights focal points in humanitarian settings.

All members of the senior leadership within field operations should understand that they serve as role models, and even if not actively engaged in daily risk identification, they are accountable for managing all risks and should ensure they are aware and up to date on the risks and ways to treat them. In practice, this will mean that different offices and components will bring their perspective and expertise to develop an integrated contextual analysis of risks and a discussion on how to treat the risks that have been identified, as will be explained in the risk management steps set out in this toolkit.



Steps of Misconduct Intergrated Risk Management

# TAILORED RISK MANAGEMENT APPROACH

Every UN Secretariat entity has a different footprint and misconduct/SEA risks may differ depending on location, whether urban or rural, the nature of the local community, type of personnel deployed, etc. A one size fits all approach may not be effective. In practice, this may mean one or more risk registers and workplans tailored for a particular field office or region, but the risk management process (Steps 1-4) will remain the same.

Are there logical divisions within the footprint of the mission/entity in which different risk registers and action plans for different risk environments would provide more focused risk management?
Some things to consider:
- Is the field operation located in a large country with numerous remote field outposts?
- What is the mandate?
- Do specific field offices/regions have internally displaced persons?
- Are there differences in security, personnel movement, and engagement in the community (shopping, restaurants, etc.) depending on deployment locations?
- Are there religious/cultural practices throughout the country that impact the risk of misconduct, particularly SEA?

If the answers to these questions show significantly different risks, a decentralized approach would be more appropriate.

Things to consider moving forward with a tailored approach:
- Where there is more than one action plan can common issues be extracted for the overall mission workplan?
- Who is responsible for the risk register and implementation of the workplan (e.g. Head of Field Office)?

Tailoring the work plans for field offices may confuse the reporting lines for misconduct. The CDT, as advisor to the Head of Mission on conduct and discipline, is the responsible office for coordinating misconduct/SEA risk management.

The process for creating a tailored risk framework, which includes multiple risk registers and workplans, is time-consuming and will need to have buy-in from all stakeholders responsible for each risk register and workplan. Consultations with each of these stakeholders is essential and to be led by the CDT or CDFP, who will work together on drafting the risk registers and workplans.

While a field operation must have a misconduct/SEA risk register and workplan, which must be reviewed at least annually, it will realistically take time and a staggered approach to complete regional/field office tailored risk registers and workplans. Once in place, tailored risk registers and workplans should be reviewed and updated on an annual basis or on an ad hoc basis where there is a significant change in circumstances that could affect risks of misconduct/SEA.

> **Examples for implementing a tailored approach**
>
> *UNMISS reviews its tailored misconduct/SEA risk registers and workplans once every three years in a comprehensive way due to resource demands. UNMISS uses addenda to account for changes that may come up in the interim during travel to field locations and engagement with Heads of Field Offices.*
>
> *MINUSCA developed an integrated and decentralized approach that created tailored [risk registers/workplans] for certain field offices, and one for the mission Headquarters. An analysis was conducted in each field office, led by CDT in close collaboration with the Heads of Field Offices to determine the priority SEA risks. Considerations included, TCC/PCC deployment, security situation in location/region, proximity to members of the local population, etc. Once the analysis was complete, a risk register/workplan was developed for each field office to encompass the entire risk register for the mission.*

Department of Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance

# COMMUNICATIONS AS PART OF MANAGING RISKS

Strategic communications cuts across all elements of the misconduct/SEA risk management process and should be reflected in the risk register and the workplan. Different approaches are possible depending on the needs of the particular entity: communications-related risk factors and activities can be integrated into a misconduct/SEA risk register and workplan, or a dedicated communications strategy on the prevention and response to SEA may be appropriate, particularly in a peace operation with a high risk of SEA.

The goals of strategic communications as part of misconduct/SEA risk management include:
- Inform external audiences (e.g. host authorities, national and international media and host communities) what misconduct/SEA is, why and how to report incidents and seek support, and how the UN Secretariat entity addresses the risks of misconduct/SEA.
- Support prevention efforts and raise awareness among internal audiences (e.g. civilian and uniformed personnel, implementing partners and contractors) of the UN's standards of conduct and expected behavior of personnel, and how to report incidents.
- Address reputational issues and mis/disinformation risks posed by incidents of misconduct/SEA through a proactive approach to strategic communications.



## Internal Communications

### Awareness raising
UN Secretariat entities are strongly encouraged to identify opportunities to raise awareness of how personnel can play their part to prevent and report misconduct/SEA. Opportunities can include:
- Inductions and training sessions, in-person and online
- Town halls and brown bag meetings
- Email broadcasts and newsletters
- Leadership engagement with personnel e.g. visits to remote locations, medal parades
- Management engagement e.g. performance discussions, team meetings
- Use of outreach materials e.g. posters, stickers, leaflets, intranet/iSeek, screen savers, radio and video messages, *no excuse cards* with reporting pathways.

### Training
Training is a critical awareness raising and prevention tool on misconduct/SEA and should be conducted upon arrival to the UN Secretariat entity for all personnel and repeated periodically. In the context of peace operations, CDTs lead on training in this area in cooperation/coordination with other stakeholders (e.g. SVROs, Integrated Mission Training Cell, Force, UNPol). Training is most effective when tailored to the audience and the misconduct/SEA risks in their work environment. It is recommended that training be customized to each T/PCC or other categories of personnel based on their language, access to technology, social and cultural norms and include interactive, participatory, and engaging roleplay-based methods, based on concrete, real-life scenarios.

# External Communications

External communications refer to communication between the UN, both from the field and from Headquarters, and external stakeholders, including the host authorities, national and international media, and host communities. External communications should be part of the overall strategic approach to managing the risks associated with misconduct, particularly SEA. Larger missions that regularly receive reports of SEA should have a dedicated SEA Strategic Communication Strategy in place as part of their misconduct/SEA risk management approach.

Communicating on the UN's standards of conduct, and particularly the prohibition against SEA, should be part of leadership communications wherever appropriate, whether during engagements with the Host State authorities, engagement with mission personnel, regular or curated press briefings and media interviews or interactions with members of the local community.

## INFORMATION ON SEA COMMUNICATIONS

The Conduct and Discipline Team or/and focal points should work closely with the Strategic Communications and Public Information office, and SVROs where relevant, to ensure that messaging is victim centred, accurate, and respects due process and the dignity and confidentiality of all parties. As part of the Senior Leader Compacts with the Secretary-General, field operation leadership are expected to communicate publicly and proactively on SEA and can benefit from specialized training offered at UNHQ as an integrated effort of the Department of Global Communications, DMSPC and DPO.

Effective complaint mechanisms, such as CBCMs, are critical communications partners. They help to mitigate the risk that victims and other community members do not report on possible misconduct/SEA by UN personnel and act as a vital link between victims and the UN. Therefore, CBCMs should be available, supported and empowered to conduct community outreach activities that are adapted to the local context, jointly with relevant mission personnel.



Central African journalists participate in a workshop on preventing and responding to acts of sexual exploitation and abuse in Bangui, January 2023. (Photo: Herve Cyriaque Serefio UN/MINUSCA)

A wide range of communications tools can be used to conduct community outreach on risks of misconduct/SEA and the available reporting pathways. These include radio/TV programming and public service announcements (PSA), the production of visual materials, social media and web posts, face-to-face activities including theatre, quizzes and other direct outreach tools, or SMS/WhatsApp information campaigns. These efforts require joint planning and, in some instances, pooled funding with the communications team in field operations as well as, as much as possible, the UN Country Team through its UN Communications Group.

PSAs and digital templates are available in English/French for download on the Trello on sexual exploitation and abuse: *https://trello.com/b/8dsqvTYY/sexual-exploitation-and-abuse*



A local theatre group helps raise awareness on the risks of misconduct in Kavumu, Democratic Republic of the Congo, August 2017. (Photo: Alain Likota UN/MONUSCO)

# MANAGING RISKS DURING TRANSITIONS

Any significant change to the mandate or footprint of a UN entity presence, whether through downsizing, transition to a new entity, or closure and withdrawal from the Host Country, must be reflected in the risk register and workplan. Transitions require a new risk analysis which would be focused on the risks associated with each step in the transition and which may need to be revisited as the transition moves forward. The risk management planning for transition follows the same integrated approach and methodology as set out in the misconduct risk management tools.

This aspect of misconduct risk management planning is of particular importance in the context of transitions from UN field operations (e.g. from a peace operation to a special political mission or a UN country presence led by a Resident Coordinator). If a field operation will be closing and withdrawing from the Host Country, it will also be necessary to take into consideration what will come next and how to handover the risk management plan, especially with regard to victims' assistance, to the UNCT or PSEA.

## Key considerations in risk managing as a peace operation draws down

- What is the current footprint of the peace operation in terms of personnel and location?
- What is the end state for the peace operation?
- What is timeline to reach that end state?
- What are the planned/anticipated phases and what is the timeline for each phase (e.g. drawdown, liquidation)?
- What are the planned movements of personnel, including uniformed personnel (including whether parties will remain with COE, whether uniformed personnel will transit through urban areas)?
- What is the strength of the CDT and SVROs and what is the plan for maintaining capacities through all transition phases?
- Is there a need to strengthen the capacities of the CDT and SVRO, where present, during transition phases?
- Have plans to maintain CDT and SVRO, where present, been integrated into the broader mission transition planning and corresponding budget requests?

| Example of risk description related to transition | Examples of risk factors related to transition |
|---|---|
| Insufficient capacity of the mission to address incidents of misconduct and ensure proper handover of the pending and ongoing conduct and discipline matters | <ul><li>CDT/SVRO presence is not retained until the end of the mission</li><li>CDT/SVRO personnel leaving due to planned closure of the mission</li><li>Lack of resources (e.g. no regular internal flights, fewer vehicles, etc.) during drawdown affecting mission's ability to travel within mission area</li></ul> |
| Victims of SEA not coming forward to report and/or not receiving needed assistance | <ul><li>Insufficient outreach to communities before and after mission's closure</li><li>Lack of understanding among local population on why and how to report allegations of misconduct</li></ul> |
| Potential increase of misconduct toward the end of the mission | <ul><li>Personnel leaving the host country without paying private legal obligations, i.e. rent, security, housekeeping, etc.</li><li>Remaining personnel, e.g. rear parties, engage in SEA with local population</li></ul> |

# TYPES OF PROHIBITED CONDUCT AND FRAUD

It is important to be mindful of the different forms of misconduct when completing your misconduct/SEA risk register. Prohibited conduct and fraud are common no matter the size, structure or mandate of a workplace and these forms of misconduct must be considered in an entity's misconduct/SEA risk analysis.

**UNITED TO RESPECT**

**Prohibited conduct** refers to discrimination, harassment, including sexual harassment, abuse of authority (see ST/SGB/2019/8), which can have a damaging impact on individuals and on mandate delivery. Prohibited conduct can result from, and lead to, an intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment and is a risk in any work setting regardless of the size or type of Secretariat entity or field operation. Managers have an important preventive role in maintaining a harmonious work environment. Managers should be aware of the provisions of ST/SGB/2019/8 and their views and experience should form part of the contextual analysis (Step 1) to help identify the priority risks, and treatments, in this area.

**Sexual harassment**, in particular, undermines the credibility of the United Nations and degrades its staff. It results from a culture of discrimination and privilege, based on unequal gender relations and power dynamics. All misconduct risk management planning should reflect the Organization's zero tolerance of sexual harassment and the need for strengthening victim-centred prevention and response efforts and fostering a safe and inclusive working environment across the UN system.

**Fraud and corruption** are types of misconduct that include: any act or omission whereby an individual or entity knowingly misrepresents or conceals a material fact to obtain an undue benefit or advantage for oneself or a third party, or to cause another to act to his or her detriment; the misuse of official authority to obtain an undue benefit for oneself or a third party.

Fraud and corruption risks are generally related to: human resources, procurement, property management, implementing partners and cybersecurity.

Examples of fraud include:
- Submitting falsified documentation;
- Misrepresenting educational qualifications;
- Making false claims in job applications;
- Knowingly submitting an entitlement claim (e.g. education grant, a travel claim) containing false information;
- Assisting a person to secure UN employment in exchange for money or other favours;
- Improperly assisting a vendor in a procurement process;
- Manipulating a procurement or recruitment process to ensure a certain outcome;
- Misusing UN resources to benefit oneself or a third party (inappropriate use of vehicles, technology, equipment etc.);
- Soliciting or accepting bribes;
- Revealing internal confidential information in order to obtain a benefit for oneself or a third party; and
- Participating in the recruitment, procurement and/or contract management process of a person with whom one has an undisclosed conflict of interest.

**YOUR IGNORANCE ON FRAUD AND CORRUPTION IS THEIR POWER**

FRAUD AND CORRUPTION AWARENESS HANDBOOK

**For more examples please click on the image.**

Department of Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance

# UTILIZING DATA FOR RISK MANAGEMENT

## Let data tell the story

MORE INFO ON USING DATA

Risk management has many subjective elements that are based on individual perception of what might be a risk. With evolving technology, the subjective elements based on substantive expertise and on-the-ground experience can be paired with available data to provide objective indicators. Using a data-driven misconduct risk management approach helps offices/missions/departments identify emerging issues of concern, trends, and possible early warning of possible risks. A data-driven approach also allows all stakeholders to be on the same page regarding organizational risks and as a result, makes the decision process smoother and better informed.

Data can help in telling a story and consequently communicate more effectively with the leadership. Data can help you prove a risk is justified and realistic. Using data, however, is only a first step. Data by itself is worth very little. To be able to fully benefit from it, data needs a narrative, analysis, and visualization. Therefore, to facilitate effective decision-making regarding managing risks, data must be turned into meaningful information and presented in an understandable way.

## Considerations in using data

- Data should be used to answer a specific question or tell a specific story. Data should be visualized for the decision-maker (e.g. senior leadership).
- While presenting it to leadership, think about the questions you might want to answer e.g. which of the contingents poses the highest risk in my mission.
- Consider what data to use (e.g. data that was collected over a period of 15 years ago might be less relevant in assessing risk today but can be very helpful in understanding overall trends).

### WHY USE DATA?

- **Observe trends**: Data analysis can help identify past and current trends of misconduct risks.
- **Monitor effectiveness** of mitigation measures
- **Data is persuasive evidence:** Provides justification for decisions, including on mitigation measures.
- **Assist in informed decision making:** Provide leadership with data driven analysis to support leadership accountability for conduct and discipline.

- Data should come from a reliable source (e.g. CMTS, Victims' Assistance Tracking System). Remember that data is only useful if its source is kept updated.
- Data collection should be planned and consistent. This will enable effective monitoring and measuring of any ongoing changes in the risk situation.
- Data without context has limited value. Context is everything. Take the security/political situation in a location into consideration while analyzing the data.
- Provide narrative. Make sure you explain where and when the data was collected; provide background information on the situation in a location where the data is from.
- Consider how data will be shared and whether it is confidential (e.g. access to the Case Management Tracking System and case-specific information is restricted).
- Be mindful what data you are sharing with stakeholders (e.g. do not disclose the information that could identify a victim of SEA or the nationality of perpetrators of SEA allegations that were reported prior to 2015 as this data is not publicly available).
- It is also a good idea to collect data from various sources including both quantitative and qualitative data. Both quantitative and qualitative data can be used to provide a holistic picture of the situation.

# Using data

Data can be used throughout the entire risk management process. This toolkit explains how data can be used in each step.

## Step 1: Identify Risks

Data on the history of misconduct/SEA in your field operation can help to understand the context.

## Step 2: Assess Risks Using Data

Data can help in assessing risks. It can, however, also be used to assess the likelihood of the risk occurring, for example there may be data showing that there have been incidents of SEA in a specific location over a period of several years, which will help influence a determine that the continued risk is highly likely.

## Step 3: Treat Risks

Once risks are identified (Step 1) and assessed (Step 2), the data on misconduct/SEA allegations can help in shaping the risk responses.

Detailed analysis of the misconduct/SEA cases, as well as whether previously implemented risk response were effective, will help decide on whether a new approach is needed. The data can also help to justify requests for dedicated resources to implement a certain risk response.

## Step 4: Monitor Risks

Data collection is essential to effective monitoring. Collecting data is an essential part in monitoring the success of a risk management strategy. Information and data can help in recognizing that a situation has improved or deteriorated and assess if a risk response has been successful.



Figure 2: SEA Allegations by investigating entity.

*All images are created for the purpose of this toolkit.



Figure 1: Social media card using data visualization

## Communications

If you collect information but you do not analyze and communicate it, the benefits of having data diminishes. Data not only helps in understanding the challenges but can also be used as a tool to increase accountability for reporting.

Once you have the data, decide what information will be helpful for the leadership and how to present it. For example, graphs such as those seen in Figures 2 and 3 below can clearly show trends, urgency and/or severity of risks in reported allegations of SEA to leadership.

Data visualizations can also be used to communicate important information transparently with the public. The choice of visualizations for internal and external communications should be considered as the audience is different. For example, figure 1 shows the same data as in Figure 3 (SEA allegations by year of incident) but in a format that can be disseminated through social media. The choice of data visualization for external communication should be consulted with public information colleagues in the entity.



Figure 3: SEA Allegations by year of incident.

Department of Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance

# Misconduct/SEA data

Data on misconduct from 2015 is available publicly. Since then, the Conduct in UN Field Mission website provides readers with information on number of misconduct cases occurring in UN missions, including breakdown per year and type of misconduct. The public can also see near real-time information on allegations received, with recent changes on the cases being highlighted in red.

Information on nationality of the alleged uniformed perpetrator, number of victims, status and final action of an investigation can be accessed.

## CONDUCT IN UN FIELD MISSIONS WEBSITE

**TABLE OF ALLEGATIONS (2015 ONWARDS)**

**Date**: Month and year when the report of the allegation is received. **Category of personnel**: Civilian (INT) = Civilian international staff, Civilian (NS) = Civilian national staff, Civilian (UNV) = Civilian United Nations Volunteer, Military (MC)= Military contingent member, Military (MO) = Military observer, Police (UNPOL) = United Nations Police, Police (FPU) = Formed Police Unit. **Allegation**: SE = Sexual exploitation, SA = Sexual abuse. **Investigation**: OIOS = Office of Internal Oversight Services, TCC = troop-contributing country, PCC = police-contributing country, NIO = National investigation officer. **Investigation (days)**: who is the investigating entity and for completed investigation, what was the duration of the investigation in days.

| Mission | Year | Month | Type of allegation |
|---|---|---|---|
| All | All | All | All |

| Category of personnel | Nationality | Victim | Result |
|---|---|---|---|
| All | All | All | All |

\* Information highlighted in red indicates new entries added and updates to previous entries made in the last 14 days

| Date | Mission | Date of incident | Personnel Type | Nationality | Victim | Allegation | Paternity claim | Paternity established | NIO appointed | Investigation (days) | Result | Interim Action | Final Action | Referral for criminal accountability |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5/2023 | MONUSCO | Unspecified / 2009 | Military (MC),1 | South Africa | Adult (1) | SE (Exploitative relationship) | Yes | Pending | Pending | Pending (Pending) | Pending (1) | UN Pending (1) | UN Pending (1) NG Pending (1) | N/A |
| 5/2023 | MONUSCO | Unspecified / 2016 | Military (MC),1 | Malawi | Adult (1) | SE (Exploitative relationship) | Yes | Pending | Pending | Pending (Pending) | Pending (1) | UN Pending (1) | UN Pending (1) | N/A |

## REMEMBER: DATA ON ITS OWN GIVE LITTLE BENEFIT.
## TO TELL A STORY, ASK YOURSELF THESE QUESTIONS

- What question do I want to answer?
- What do these data points tell me?
- Who should you share the data and your findings with?
- How to communicate your finding with various stakeholders?
- What data can you share? What information is confidential?
- What visualization can be useful to senior leadership? Pie chart, bar graph, heat map, etc.?

## Case Management Tracking System (CMTS)

CMTS facilitates case management and information sharing between CDS and all Secretariat entities, including field missions. Due to the confidentiality of the information included in the database, access to the database is restricted only to those individuals who are directly involved in the management of matters of possible unsatisfactory conduct. First and foremost, this means the CDFP and their alternate, but if necessary, one additional colleague for administrative support and data entry.



Example of a heat map showing allegation per location

## PowerBI Dashboards

Dedicated Power BI dashboards are available, based on data entered in CMTS, to those who have access to CMTS. These dashboards:

- Enable convenient access to reports and statistics on reports of possible misconduct for your respective entities.
- Enhance oversight, enable trend analysis of matters of all categories of misconduct, and support improved management of risks globally and in individual locations.
- Provide a quick overview of the status of all matters entered in CMTS for your entity and allow for you to see where further actions or updates for cases may be needed.

CMTS and Power BI are not the only sources of data on misconduct. Other sources of information relevant to risk management include: previously implemented risk action plans, UN SAGE and UniteAware.

The UN SAGE and UniteAware provide information on incidents and crisis information, including visualization of data through mission specific maps and analytics to help identify emerging trends.

### Power BI: Available Misconduct/SEA Data

- Number of misconduct cases reported per year
- Type of misconduct
- Evolution of each type of misconduct over time
- Allegations per location (for major missions a visual map is available)

- Category of personnel implicated in misconduct
- Allegations by nationality of uniformed personnel
- Number of identified victims by age group
- Number of unresolved/open allegations
- Investigation length

Australian, Indian and Cambodian Army officers discuss interview tactics, during a UN National Investigation Officer Training of Trainers Course conducted in Melbourne, Australia. (Photo: Corporal Olivia Cameron, Australian Defense Force)

# PART 2:
# MISCONDUCT/SEA
# RISK MANAGEMENT GUIDANCE

# STEP 1 - UNDERSTAND THE CONTEXT AND IDENTIFY RISKS

- To understand the external context, the profile and mandate/programme of work of the field operation.
- To identify all risks to the field operation's objectives on misconduct/SEA.
- To identify the causes and consequences of those risks.
- To define what the misconduct/SEA workplan should focus on.

## ACTION 1

**Analyse the external context, UN Secretariat entity's profile and mandate and identify ALL risks to the UN Secretariat entity's objectives on misconduct/SEA. Insert these into the risk register**

- Conduct situation analysis to understand the external context as well as the field operation's profile and mandate/programme.
- Brainstorm and identify ALL risks to the UN Secretariat entity's objectives on misconduct/SEA.
- Insert these risks into the risk register.
- The risk register should now include for each risk the following information: a risk ID, a description of the risk and its consequence(s), and a list of risk factors.

## Situation analysis and risk identification

A good understanding of the external context as well as the UN Secretariat entity profile and mandate is needed before risks can be identified. Once there is a good understanding of the environment in which the UN Secretariat entity is operating, users should identify ALL risks to the UN Secretariat entity's objectives on misconduct/SEA and insert these into the risk register.

## Ways to gather information on the situation and risks

Information on the situation or risks can be gathered in various ways, including through a one-off exercise, or regular engagement through existing mechanisms where conduct and discipline is discussed (see Box 'Option for integrated situational analysis'). A one-off exercise can take the form of a workshop or multiple bilateral discussions, and it may be sufficient to have one such exercise for the field operation or distinct exercise for different field offices or deployment locations. In identifying risks, the UN Secretariat entities should also review recommendations from relevant external audits, evaluations, and boards of inquiry, as appropriate.

## Importance of data in identifying risks

Data on the history of misconduct/SEA in your UN Secretariat entity can help to understand the context. This can include locations where previous incidents of SEA occurred or common types of misconduct. However, this should also be complemented by information and data from other relevant components, such as deployments of uniformed personnel, safety and security issues. These are examples of what should be part of the integrated contextual analysis with other field operation component and stakeholders. For more information on use of data, please see **Utilizing data for misconduct/SEA risk management** section.

**Option for integrated situational analysis**

*The field operation can conduct a **one-off information gathering exercise** to understand the external context and the specific types of risks and risk factors for misconduct/SEA. In one example from UNFICYP, data was collected on a range of issues such as the nature of the commercial sex industry in Nicosia where all UN personnel are based, services available in Cyprus to victims of sexual violence, the profile of field operation personnel and what measures were already in place in the field operation to prevent SEA. The data was collected through a desk-based review of documents (e.g. reports from the UN Country Team, non-governmental organizations and Government of the Republic of Cyprus, media sources and internal staffing and security incident data from the field operation) as well as interviews with NGOs and embassies. The military, police and civilian components may split the task of collecting the data. This information is valuable to identify misconduct risks and risk factors and can be used to develop the field operation's annual workplan on misconduct risk management approach.*



A MINUSCA police officer raising awareness among 20 members of the Central African Armed Forces and three guards from their camp about gender-based violence (Photo: MINUSCA/Safiatou Doumbia)

# Workshop techniques to analyse the situation and identify risks

When conducting situation analysis in a workshop setting, techniques such as SWOT analysis (Strength, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats) and PESTLE analysis (Political, Economic, Social, Technological, Legal and Environmental) can be used to aid the analysis process. For example, SWOT analysis can be used to understand which of the field operation's approaches to addressing misconduct/SEA are working well and where there are weaknesses that need to be addressed, as well as to identify external opportunities that the field operation can harness and external threats to the achievement of the field operation's objectives on misconduct/SEA. The internal weaknesses and external threats are potential sources of risks that would harm the achievement of the field operation's objectives on misconduct/SEA.

# How to describe a risk

In the risk register, users should provide a description of the risk and its consequence(s). Users should also list separately the risk factors that cause the risk (see Table below). This provides a more detailed description of the risk, which makes it easier to identify ways to address the risk.

| Example of a risk description | Examples of risk factors |
|---|---|
| The **evidence in SEA cases is unavailable or difficult to authenticate**, **which results in** difficulty in substantiating allegations, impunity for perpetrators, further trauma and harm to victims or witnesses, a perception of a UN cover-up and damage to the Mission's credibility and mandate implementation | <ul><li>Physical evidence has been contaminated or destroyed due to delays in the arrival of the TCC/UN investigators;</li><li>Victims/witnesses cannot be traced or refuse to collaborate with the investigation;</li><li>Perpetrators use pseudonyms or victims do not know the true name of the perpetrator, making identification of the perpetrator difficult/impossible;</li><li>Victims/witnesses are interviewed multiple times which adds to their trauma and erodes the quality of the evidence;</li><li>Delays in reporting SEA pose challenges in gathering evidence;</li><li>Nominal rolls of uniformed personnel are not maintained accurately or consistently by the mission.</li></ul> |

Table: Sample risk description and risk factors

## AT THE END OF STEP 1

Users should identify risks to each of the field operation/entity's three objectives on misconduct and related risk factors and insert these into the risk register. The risk register should now include for each risk the following information: a risk ID, a description of the risk and its consequence(s), and a list of risk factors.

> Think carefully about how detailed you want to be when listing risks. If your risk register is too long, those reviewing it will lose interest. If it's too short, some key risks may be missed. As a general rule, a risk register for a large field operations where the residual risk of UN personnel committing misconduct is high, including SEA, will likely have 10-15 risks. To keep the risk register to a manageable length, check to see if you can merge similar risks into a more general one.

**For the field operation misconduct/SEA workplan:** Step 1 can help define which specific issues the field operation wishes to focus on in its annual workplan. For example, if a field operation will have more TCCs and PCCs who are new to UN operations in the year to come, the misconduct/SEA workplan may increase its focus on awareness-raising and training on UN standards of conduct for uniform personnel.

Department of Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance

# STEP 2 - ASSESS RISKS

- To assess the likelihood of each risk occurring.
- To assess the impact of each risk on an objective.
- To assess the effectiveness of internal controls for each risk.
- To assess the severity of the residual risk, after internal controls have been applied.
- To prioritize risks and identify which risks should be the focus of the UN Secretariat Entity's attention.

Assessing risks is more an art than a science. Although scales are provided to encourage a consistent approach, misconduct/SEA risk assessment is essentially subjective and depends heavily on the user's understanding of the unique context in which the field operation operates.  The ultimate aim of assessing risks is to identify which risks are a priority and should be the focus of the field operation's attention. The scores generated in step 2 are only useful so far as they help with this thinking process.

**The Digital Risk Assessment Visit Tool** is a digital tool is designed to increase flexibility and efficiency in conducting risk assessment visits. The tool, which can be used on a mobile phone, tablet or computer, is functional online or offline. It can be used by the CDT or CDFP as well as other components which are likely to visit locations that should be assessed against risks of misconduct/SEA (e.g. the Force, the Police, Civil Affairs etc.) in coordination with the CDT or CDFP. This Tool also has a reporting capability (with data visualization based on the fields captured). Photos/videos can be uploaded and captured, and the results of the visit are made directly available to CDT providing a broader scope for eyes on the ground.

## Data and assessment of risks

Historic data can help in identifying risks but also assessing the likelihood and frequency of the risk occurring again and in consequence deciding on the priority of each risk.

Data can also help to evaluate past risk responses and how effective they were. Understanding trends also allow to assess effectiveness of existing internal controls and previously implemented risk responses. For more information on assessing risks, please refer to the data section in this toolkit.

## ACTION 2

## Assess the likelihood of the risk occurring

- For each risk listed in the risk register, assess its likelihood of occurring in the future.
- Score the likelihood of the risk using this scale: 1 (rare), 2 (unlikely), 3 (likely),  4 (highly likely), 5 (imminent).
- Insert the score into the risk register. Repeat for all risks.

## How to assess the likelihood of a risk

When scoring the likelihood of a risk occurring, answer the following question: "How likely is it that the risk will happen in the future?". Users should score the likelihood of the risk occurring on a scale of 1 to 5: 1 (rare), 2 (unlikely), 3 (likely), 4 (highly likely), 5 (imminent). The descriptions for each score can be found in **table 'Scoring criteria to measure the likelihood of occurrence of misconduct-related risks'** on the next page.

Table: Scoring criteria to measure the likelihood of occurrence of misconduct-related risks

| Score | Rating | Certainty | Frequency |
|-------|--------|-----------|-----------|
| 5 | Imminent | More than 90 percent | Could occur very frequently; or could occur at least once every three months (i.e. at least once per quarter) based on past data |
| 4 | Highly likely | Less than 90 percent | Could occur frequently; or could occur at least once every six months based on past data |
| 3 | Likely | Less than 60 percent | Could be recurrent but not frequent; or could occur at least once every twelve months based on past data |
| 2 | Unlikely | Less than 30 percent | Could occur but not common; or could occur at least every 1-2 years based on past data |
| 1 | Rare | Less than 10 percent | Would almost never occur; or could occur at least every 2 years or more based on past data |

When deciding on a score, users should take into consideration two criteria: **certainty** and **frequency**. In other words, users need to ask themselves:

- How certain is it that the risk will occur?
- How frequently is this risk likely to occur?

For example, when developing or reviewing a risk register users need to consider how certain it is that the risk will occur in the next twelve months, and how frequently is this risk likely to occur over the next twelve months. When deciding on a score, users should make a judgement, based on their understanding of the context and risk factors. If available, users should also examine any statistics on misconduct/SEA for the field operation (e.g. data on allegations, cases, investigations and victims), since data on what has happened in the past can give a good indication of what is likely to happen in the future.

## ACTION 3

## Assess the impact of the risk on the objective

- For each risk listed in the risk register, assess its expected impact on the objective.
- Score the impact of the risk using this scale: 1 (low), 2 (moderate), 3 (high), 4 (significant), 5 (critical).
- Insert this score into the risk register. Repeat for all risks.

## Assessing the impact of a risk

When scoring the impact of a risk on an objective, users are answering the question: "If the risk happens, how severe will its impact be on the objective in the UN entity's misconduct workplan?". Users should score the impact of the risk on a scale of 1 to 5: 1 (low), 2 (moderate), 3 (high), 4 (significant), 5 (critical). The descriptions for each score can be found in the **table 'Scoring criteria to measure the impact of misconduct/SEA-related risks'** on the next page.

Table: Scoring criteria to measure the impact of misconduct/SEA-related risks

| Score | Rating | Safety and security, particularly for SEA victims | Operational | Reputational | Financial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5 | Critical | Loss of life of UN personnel; or Loss of life of members of the population, including victims, witnesses and children born as a result of SEA; or Loss of life of personnel of UN partner organizations. | The objective in the misconduct/SEA workplan can no longer be achieved; or Mandate/programme implementation is severely affected. | Reports in key international and national media/forum for more than one week | The risk cannot be addressed using existing resources and additional resources need to be obtained (e.g. from Member States, UN headquarters). |
| 4 | Significant | Physical injury and/or non-physical threats and harm to UN personnel; or Physical injury and/or non-physical threats and harm to members of the population, including victims, witnesses and children born as a result of SEA; or Physical injury and/or non-physical threats and harm to UN partner organizations. Note: If there is a risk of physical injury and/or non-physical threat, the risk will always be considered as 4 (significant) not 3 (high). | Significant, on-going interruption to implementation of the objective in the misconduct/SEA workplan; or Significant, on-going interruptions to mandate/ programme implementation. | Comments in international media/forum | Addressing the risk requires significant re-allocation of resources; resources need to be diverted away from mandate/programme implementation to address this risk. |
| 3 | High | | Moderate interruptions to implementation of the objective in the misconduct/SEA workplan; or Moderate interruptions to mandate/ programme implementation. | Several external comments within the host country | Addressing the risk requires moderate re-allocation of resources. No resources are diverted away from mandate/programme implementation to address this risk. |
| 2 | Moderate | Loss of, or damage to, or misuse of UN infrastructure, equipment and other assets (e.g. offices, computers, phones, vehicles). | Limited interruptions to implementation of the objective in the misconduct/SEA workplan; or Limited interruptions to mandate/ programme implementation. | Isolated external comments within the host country | Addressing the risk requires limited re-allocation of resources. No resources are diverted away from mandate/ programme implementation to address this risk. |
| 1 | Low/none | Insignificant or none. | Insignificant or none | Insignificant or none | Addressing the risk can be done using existing staffing and resources. Resources do not have to be re-allocated to address this risk. |

When deciding on a score, take into consideration four criteria, namely, the **safety and security, particularly of SEA victims, operational, reputational risks, and financial impact**. In other words, ask the following questions:

- What impact will the risk have on the safety and security of SEA victims, UN personnel, of the population and of UN partner organizations as well as on UN infrastructure, equipment, and other assets?
- What operational impact will the risk have on the field operation? In other words, what impact will it have on the achievement of the objectives in the misconduct/SEA workplan, and will the risk have a broader impact on other mandate/programme objectives?
- What impact will the risk have on the reputation of the UN or field operation?
- What impact will the risk have on the resources available to implement the field operation's mandate or programmes?

Users should make their own judgement as to the relative weighting given to each of the four criteria, as this will be context specific. Understanding the external context, the UN Secretariat entity's profile and mandate/programme(s) are critical to assigning an impact score. For example, during politically tense moments, the risk of UN personnel committing an egregious form of misconduct may have a greater impact on mandate/programme implementation than at other times. Again, if available, users should also examine any data available on the impact of risks (e.g. on the reputational impact of past misconduct allegations), since data on what has happened in the past can give a good indication of future impact.

## ACTION 4

# Assess the effectiveness of internal controls for the risk

- For each risk, assess the effectiveness of the UN Secretariat entity's existing internal controls.
- Score the effectiveness of internal controls using this scale:  1 (highly ineffective), 2 (ineffective), 3 (significant improvement needed), 4 (limited improvement needed), 5 (effective).
- Insert this score into the risk register. Repeat for all risks.

## Internal controls

Any action that is taken by the entity to address a risk forms part of what is known as "internal control". These internal controls are listed as outputs and activities in the entity's misconduct workplan.

## Assessing the effectiveness of internal controls

When scoring the effectiveness of internal controls, answer the question: "How effective are the internal controls at reducing the likelihood and/or impact of this risk?". Users should score the effectiveness of internal controls on a scale of 1 to 5:  1 (highly ineffective), 2 (ineffective), 3 (significant improvement needed), 4 (limited improvement needed), 5 (effective). The descriptions for each score can be found in the table 'Scoring criteria to measure the effectiveness of internal controls on misconduct'. In deciding how to score, users should use subjective judgement as well as any data from formal misconduct risk assessment visits to UN premises that examine the adequacy of internal controls.

Table: Scoring criteria to measure the effectiveness of internal controls on misconduct

| Score | Rating | Description |
|---|---|---|
| 5 | Effective | Controls are properly designed and operating as intended. Management activities are effective in managing and mitigating risks. |
| 4 | Limited improvement needed | Controls and/or management activities are properly designed and operating somewhat effectively, with some opportunities for improvement identified. |
| 3 | Significant improvement needed | Key controls and/or management activities in place, with significant opportunities for improvement identified. |
| 2 | Ineffective | Limited controls and/or management activities are in place, high level of risk remains. Controls and/or management activities are designed and are somewhat ineffective in efficiently mitigating risk or driving efficiency. |
| 1 | Highly ineffective | Controls and/or management activities are non-existent or have major deficiencies and do not operate as intended. Controls and/or management activities as designed are highly ineffective in efficiently mitigating risk. |

## ACTION 5

# Assess the severity of the residual risk

- For each risk, assess the severity of the residual risk, after the effectiveness of internal controls has been taken into account.
- Score the severity of the residual risk using this colour-coded scale: Very High (Red), High (Orange), Medium (Yellow), Low (Green).
- Insert this score into the risk register.
- Repeat for all risks.

# Residual risks

A residual risk is the risk after the effectiveness of internal controls has been taken into account. When scoring the severity of the residual risk, answer the question: "How severe is the risk, after the effectiveness of existing internal controls has been taken into account?". Users should score the risks on a 4-point scale that is colour-coded using a traffic light system: Very High (Red), High (Orange), Medium (Yellow), Low (Green).

In deciding how to score the residual risk, users should use their own judgement. The descriptions for each score can be found in the table 'Scoring criteria to measure the severity of the residual risk'. As the severity of the risk increases, so does the level of attention given to it by UN leadership, managers, and commanders.

Table: Scoring criteria to measure the severity of the residual risk

| Scoring | Rating | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Red | Very High | Very high risks are perceived to be of greatest importance and require the most attention from leadership, managers and commanders. Treatment action is likely to continuously involve leadership. Treatment action may also involve UN Headquarters and Member States. |
| Amber | High | High risks require dedicated focus and specific remedial action. Treatment action is likely to regularly involve leadership and continuously involve managers and commanders. |
| Yellow | Moderate | Moderate risks require specific remedial measures or monitoring measures. Treatment action is likely to involve specific actions by managers and commanders or monitoring of risks. |
| Green | Low | Low risks require periodic monitoring to provide assurance that the level of risk is not increasing. |

## ACTION 6

## Identify the priority risks for the UN Secretariat entity to focus

- Identify risks that are a priority for the UN Secretariat entity to consider: these should be the focus of the UN Secretariat entity's efforts.

## Priority risks

Not all risks can receive equal attention. Leadership, managers and commanders have limited time and need to focus their attention on the biggest risks. The decision on which risks are a priority should be based partly on the severity of the residual risk (i.e. the more severe the residual risk, the more it is a priority) and partly on other factors. For instance, since all UN entities have the responsibility to try to prevent acts of misconduct, risks to this objective will need to be prioritized. Other issues to consider include how urgent it is to address the risk, whether one risk needs to be tackled before another can be addressed, and the extent to which the UN Secretariat entity can influence the risk. The decision on which risks are a priority is best done in a consultative way and must ultimately be agreed-upon by leadership.

> Put the words "**PRIORITY**" in the risk description of priority risks. This gives a clear signal that the entity should focus its attention on these risks.



UN peacekeepers with the UN mission in Haiti, MINUJUSTH, participate in awareness-raising efforts on sexual misconduct. (Photo: Leonora Baumann UN/MINUJUSTH)

## AT THE END OF STEP 2

Users should now add to the risk register five different scores for each risk: a score for likelihood, for impact, for the effectiveness of internal controls and for the severity of residual risks.

Users then prioritize risks and identify which risks should be the focus of the field operation's attention.

> Sort the risk register in descending order of severity of residual risk so that the "Very High" risks are at the top of the risk register and "Low" risks are at the bottom of the risk register. This will focus leadership's attention on the more severe risks at the top of the list.

Department of Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance

# STEP 3 - TREAT RISKS

- To identify measures to respond to each risk.
- To assign an action owner and due date to each risk response.

## ACTION 7

## Identify a risk treatment plan and insert it into the risk register

- For each residual risk, identify 1 or more risk response with an action owner and due date. Insert this information into the risk register.

## Risk treatment plan

For each residual risk, identify your risk treatment plan. The risk treatment plan consists of a risk response(s) as well as an action owner and a date by which each risk response should be completed. Some risks will require several risk responses. In such cases, one action owner should be listed for each risk response.

When developing a risk treatment plan, users should always consider how they can avoid or reduce the negative impact of risks on victims, including through measures to support victims. For example, a risk treatment plan to treat the risk of an investigation taking longer than it is supposed to, should include actions to reduce the trauma, harm and revictimization of victims, regularly inform victims of progress and status, and other measures to support and assist victims, including protection from retaliation and stigmatization.

## Risk response

The majority of the time, the entity will be trying to implement risk responses that mitigate the risk i.e. that either reduce the likelihood of the risk occurring or reduce the impact of the risk. Risk responses therefore typically involve either expanding existing internal controls that are already included in the entity's misconduct workplan (e.g. increasing awareness raising activities on specific forms of misconduct) or doing something new altogether (e.g. adopting a new set of standing operating procedures on conduct and discipline issues).

> In the risk register, do not repeat internal controls under risk responses. Think of internal controls as the day-to-day, on-going, routine measures that the UN Secretariat entity has in place to address risks. Think of risk responses as extra measures implemented in addition to the internal controls.

A risk response usually addresses either a risk factor (e.g. weak mechanisms to receive complaints) or a consequence of the risk (e.g. reputational damage to the mission), which is why it is important in the risk register to identify not only the risk, but also its causes and consequences. That makes it possible to check whether the risk response is fit for purpose.

> Make sure that the risk response is feasible to implement and cost-effective. Treating risks is likely to require additional staff time and other resources. In most cases, these extra costs can be funded using existing resources.

Once risks are identified and assessed, the historical data on misconduct/SEA cases can help in shaping the response. Detailed analysis of the misconduct/SEA cases as well as previously implemented risk action plans allow us to see if previously implemented risk responses were effective and should be implemented again or help decide on whether a new approach is needed. The data can also help in justifying requests for dedicated resources to implement a certain risk response. For more information on data please see *Utilizing data for risk management* section.

## Action owner

An action owner is the individual or office in the field operation that is responsible for implementing a risk response. Action owners do not necessarily carry out the actions themselves but instead ensure that the most appropriate person under his/her supervision or command does.

## AT THE END OF STEP 3

Users should now add to the risk register the following information for each risk: 1 or more risk response with an action owner and due date.

# The misconduct/SEA risk register is now complete and ready to use.

# STEP 4 - MONITOR RISKS

- To monitor how risks are being addressed by the UN Secretariat entity.
- To monitor whether risks facing the UN Secretariat entity are changing.
- To determine if a new risk analysis exercise is needed.

## ACTION 8

### Use the risk register to review risks and take decisions on how best to address them

- Leadership should meet, at least quarterly, to review the UN Secretariat entity's misconduct/SEA workplan and risk register.
- During the meeting, use the risk register as a starting point to take decisions about risks and how to address them.
- After the meeting, circulate an updated risk register that reflects any changes agreed to at the meeting.
- Don't forget to date the risk register.

## How to use the risk register in meetings with leadership

It is good practice for leadership to meet at least quarterly to review the UN Secretariat entity's misconduct/SEA workplan and risk register. When reviewing the risk register, the situation in the upcoming three-month period (and beyond) should be considered and questions should be asked such as:

- Are the risks listed in the risk register still relevant? Should any new risks be added?
- Is the list of priority risks still accurate? Have new priority risks emerged? Should any risk be downgraded and no longer be considered a priority?
- Are the scores for the risks and internal controls still accurate?
- Do any severe risks need to be escalated to the attention of the field operation's leadership?
- What is the trend for each risk? Is the risk remaining constant, or increasing or decreasing?
- What is the status of implementation of risk responses? Are they on schedule?
- Can any risk responses be marked as "completed"?

The risk register should be treated as a living document. This means that any new risks that appear outside of the scheduled meetings with leadership should be added to the register, and if needed, an ad hoc meeting called to discuss how to address it. If the risk register is not regularly updated, it will quickly become stale, and reviewers will lose interest.

When a new risk is added, put the words "new" in the risk description. When a risk response is completed, leave it in the risk register and add the words "completed".

## ACTION 9

# Conduct trend analysis to determine whether risks are changing

- Use a combination of quantitative and qualitative data to build up a picture of how risks are evolving over time.

One approach to analysing whether misconduct/SEA risks are changing is to do a trend analysis at the end of the year, using the risk register. Assuming that leadership meets at least once a quarter, by the end of the year, the entity will have the original risk register and three updates. This enables the entity to do trend analysis and look at how risks have evolved over the past year. These past trends can give an indication of what to expect in the future. For example, if the level of risk that "UN personnel do not report allegations of misconduct," has remained constant throughout the year, it may mean that the current risk treatment strategy is not working and that it's time to try a new approach.

Another approach to analysing whether risks are changing is to monitor quantitative indicators of risks and to supplement this with qualitative information on risks. For example, the entity's misconduct workplan will have a monitoring plan that includes quantitative performance indicators. The entity could also include among these performance indicators some qualitative indicators to monitor risks. For example, an indicator measuring the "Proportion of investigations reports produced by the Mission's Special Investigations Unit (SIU) that were returned to them for further investigation" is a way to track whether the risk that 'Misconduct allegations are not properly investigated by the mission' is changing. However, monitoring these quantitative indicators of risks over time will not be enough to understand whether risk levels are changing or remaining constant. Such quantitative data should be supplemented with qualitative data such as the views on changing risks and risk factors from, for example, conduct and discipline experts, human resources management experts, UN investigators, UN staff unions, civil society as well as from feedback from victims.

## ACTION 10

# Conduct a new risk analysis when needed

- This may be necessary when there is a significant change in the external context, the field operation's mandate/programme and/or the mission's profile.

## When to conduct a new risk analysis

There will be times when it is necessary to conduct a new risk analysis. This may be necessary when there is a significant change in the external context, the UN entity's mandate/programme and/or the mission's profile. For example, if a new programme requires a sudden increase in the number of UN personnel and deployment of personnel to new locations, or if there is planned transition from a peace operation to a different type of UN presence in the country, this will require a re-think of the field operation's approach to misconduct and how it manages related risks.

**The Light Touch Approach: Using the Toolkit with limited conduct and discipline capacity**

*Smaller field operations typically have small CDTs (e.g. 1-2 persons) or the conduct and discipline function is carried out by a single focal point (who also has another full-time job), as is the case in non field entities. Here are some tips on how to use the Toolkit in entities/field operations with few staff dedicated to conduct and discipline issues:*

- *Use the Toolkit to develop a Misconduct/SEA workplan and risk register that covers all forms of misconduct (e.g. drunk driving, theft), including SEA. Regional conduct and discipline capacities can develop a regional misconduct workplan and regional risk register covering several missions.*
- *Be efficient and combine risk assessment activities with other routine conduct and discipline tasks. For example, when planning a visit to a field location to conduct awareness raising and training on SEA prevention, add on some extra time to conduct an SEA risk assessment visit.*
- *Share the workload with other field operation components. For example, seek support from other mission components or offices to assist/review the misconduct/SEA workplan and risk register in their area of expertise.*
- *Follow the same 4-step risk management process described in this Toolkit but conduct each step with a lighter touch. For example:*
  - *Instead of conducting an in-depth risk assessment exercise, convene a two-hour leadership-level meeting of the Standing SEA Task Force and brainstorm key risks facing the mission (Step 1). Instead of producing a stand-alone risk analysis report, note the key points from the risk analysis in minutes of the meeting. In missions where the mandate, footprint or security situation remains fairly static, it may only be necessary to conduct an annual, light touch refresh of the risk analysis on SEA.*
  - *The CDT and/or focal point can take the lead in assessing the risks and identifying risk treatment measures (Steps 2 & 3). This approach is less participatory but it's quicker and less resource intensive.*
  - *Once the initial drafts are complete, give other field operation components/entity offices a chance to comment on the misconduct/SEA workplan and risk register before it is finalized.*
  - *Monitor changes to risks every quarter (Step 4). However, to save time, brief leadership, managers and commanders verbally about whether risks are changing. Note key changes to risks in the minutes of the meeting instead of updating the Mission-wide misconduct risk register every quarter.*
  - *After that, if the situation remains largely the same, only update the misconduct/SEA workplan and risk register annually.*

A Congolese woman promotes women's rights through a message printed on her dress. (Photo: Abel Kavanagh UN/MONUSCO)

# PART 3:
# RISK MANAGEMENT FOR SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND ABUSE

# ADDRESSING THE UNIQUE RISKS OF SEA

Sexual exploitation and sexual abuse is a particularly egregious type of misconduct - it is committed by those who are meant to serve and protect and victimizes those who are vulnerable and should be protected. SEA often occurs in settings where different UN entities operate; therefore, the most effective way to manage the risk of SEA is to ensure an approach that is coordinated across the UN system on the ground.

SEA has unique risks based on the nature of the harm done to individuals, local communities and the Organization as a whole. These risks require tailored treatment measures. The risk management methodology and tools in this Toolkit are used for all types of misconduct, including SEA, however this section looks at risk management approaches that are specifically applicable to the risk of SEA.

The field operation's **SEA risk register** should not be confused with its overall risk register, which addresses the universe of risks that must be managed to implement all mandated objectives. In the overall risk register there will typically be only one SEA-related risk and provide a high-level overview of how it will be addressed. The SEA risk register, which will be part of the dedicated misconduct risk register, will be more detailed and contain possibly up to 10-15 SEA-related risks.

> In the UN Secretariat entity's risk register, a typical SEA-related risk might be described as "The risk that UN personnel commit SEA with the population". In contrast, in the mission's SEA risk register, there may be several entries for this type of risk, describing the risk in greater detail e.g. "UN civilians and experts on mission sexually exploit or abuse adult domestic workers in their private accommodation".

It should also be recalled that the Secretary-General requires that every UN entity submit an annual **SEA Action Plan**, which is coordinated by the Office of the Special Coordinator for Improving the United Nations' Response to SEA. In principle, the information that is contained in the UN Secretariat entity's misconduct/SEA risk register and workplan will feed into the SEA Action Plan, which is meant to be done from a country-wide perspective.

## SEA risks in field mission component-level planning

Risk management assists UN Secretariat entity's managers and commanders to implement the mandate in a way that minimizes harm to the population. When mission components, such as the Force or Police, conduct planning and risk management for their own areas of work, they should also consider whether there are any SEA-related risks, which should always be discussed and coordinated with the CDT or focal point to ensure an integrated approach.

Some examples are:
- when military deployments are being planned to remote locations, conduct an analysis of the location to identify and mitigate risks of SEA;
- the mission support component should ask itself how it can design UN contingent camps in order to better manage SEA risks (e.g. is there population fleeing conflict who are likely to settle near the camp in search of protection? is there sufficient space inside the camp for outdoor games/sports so as to reduce the need for contingent members to be outside of their barracks while off-duty?);
- consider whether additional SEA risk mitigation measures are needed (e.g. increasing the frequency of oversight visits by senior military commanders; prioritizing the establishment of a CBCM, which will conduct awareness raising with the population on UN standards of conduct on SEA);
- when security risk assessments are being conducted, the impact of new SEA allegations on the safety and security of mission personnel should also be assessed.

　　　　　　　　Department of Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance

**Tracking changing risk levels through <u>Community-Based Complaint Mechanisms</u>**

*Many missions have set up a number of CBCMs in areas facing a higher risk of UN personnel committing SEA. These mechanisms are composed of civil society representatives from the surrounding communities who help conduct outreach on SEA issues and channel complaints. The CBCMs have alerted the mission to changing risks and risk factors. CBCMs are helpful not only in receiving complaints. CDTs should remain in close contact with CBCMs to monitor whether there are new or evolving risks e.g. the presence of bars or brothels; rumours of contingent members acting inappropriately with members of the local community.*

*Communicating with CBCMs is an important risk mitigation activity and aspect of external communications. See section on **External communication**.*

# SEA risk management: a partnership between UN entities on the ground, UN Headquarters and Member States

While this toolkit provides guidance and tools to support field operations, the risks of misconduct/SEA are managed holistically and in partnership with the field, UN Headquarters and TCCs and PCCs.

**UN Headquarters**, for example, coordinates with key stakeholders to ensure that the history of misconduct, particularly SEA, is considered in force generation decisions; engages with TCCs and PCCs on case management and the resolution of paternity and child support claims; updates SEA E-Learning and core pre-deployment training materials on conduct and discipline and SEA; and manages the Trust Fund in Support of Victims of SEA to enable field-based projects to respond to the needs of victims.

**UN entities on the ground** work under the DSRSG/RC/HC, through the PSEA Coordinator, to ensure that there is an integrated approach to SEA risk management in a given country or area. Complainants of SEA will often see any alleged perpetrator as "UN personnel" and may not, and should not, be expected to identify to which entity they belong. UN entities on the ground will need to cooperate to ensure that complaints are properly referred and will be a critical resource for assisting victims of SEA.

**Field operations and UN Headquarters** also work together, for instance to coordinate on strategic communications related to SEA allegations; to conduct quality assurance exercises to ensure reliable data for informed decision making; to support National Investigation Officers during in-mission investigations; and to engage with paternity focal points in Member States on individual pending paternity claims. It is critical that field operations give an early, informal head's up (via email) to UN Headquarters (CDS/DMSPC) of any possible risk of SEA, even if the available information is only partial or based on rumors.

**TCCs and PCCs** can mitigate the risk of their personnel committing SEA while deployed in the mission area, for example, through providing high quality pre-deployment training on UN standards of conduct on SEA, appointing effective contingent commanders who are able to maintain good order and discipline and through adequate welfare provision while on deployment.

Please visit the Appendix to find tools related to managing risks of sexual exploitation and abuse.

# VICTIM-CENTRED APPROACH

The victim-centred approach puts the rights and dignity of victims, including their well-being and safety, at the forefront of all efforts to prevent and respond to SEA and sexual harassment, regardless of the affiliation of the alleged perpetrator.

The victim-centred approach is founded on the rights of victims and a set of guiding principles. It refers to a systematic way of engaging with victim(s), from the moment that allegations are known and in every subsequent interaction. It requires the empathetic, individualized, holistic delivery of continuous and reliable services in a non-judgmental and non-discriminatory manner.

## VICTIMS RIGHTS STATEMENT

ASSISTING VICTIMS OF SEXUAL MISCONDUCT BY ANYONE WORKING FOR THE UN.

I have the right.

#VictimsRightsFirst

The person in this photo is not an actual victim.

## VICTIMS ASSISTANCE PROTOCOL

The priority is creating an enabling environment in which victims can speak to someone they can trust, safely and confidentially, that they will be listened to and heard, feel supported and empowered, and that they can express their needs and wishes.

Victims must be fully informed at every stage of the process, including about what they can expect and what is and is not possible, and to have the opportunity to provide consent before any action is taken on their behalf, giving them back as much control and sense of personal agency as is feasible. They must be protected from stigmatization, discrimination, retaliation, and re-traumatization.

## VICTIM-CENTRED APPROACH TRAINING MODULE

Major Shruti Patil from the Indian Army discusses the learnings from the UN National Investigation Officer Training of Trainers course conducted at RAAF Williams Laverton, Australia (Photo: Corporal Olivia Cameron, Australian Defence Force (ADF)

## APPENDIX: TOOLS & EXAMPLES

# RISK MANAGEMENT TOOLKIT

**DEPARTMENT OF
MANAGEMENT STRATEGY,
POLICY AND COMPLIANCE**

# QUICK GUIDE TO DEVELOPMENT OF THE RISK REGISTER

This quick guide will take you through the steps to develop your entity's risk register, as discussed in more detail in the Toolkit, and will provide you with some examples to help fill in the columns that take up a risk register.

## STEP 1: UNDERSTAND THE CONTEXT AND IDENTIFY RISKS

- Conduct situation analysis to understand the external context as well as the field operation's profile and mandate/programme.
- Brainstorm and identify ALL risks to the mission's objectives on misconduct/SEA.
- At the end of Step 1 your risk register will have: **a risk ID**, a **description of the risk and its consequence(s)**, and a **list of risk factors**.

### STEP 1: RISK REGISTER COLUMNS

| Risk ID | Risk & its consequence(s) | Risk factors (causes of the risk) |
|---------|---------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| 1 | Military and police contingent personnel engage in SEA [Priority] | - High prevalence of bars/hotels in areas close to UN camps;<br>- Cultural attitudes of the population that tolerate or condone transactional sex;<br>- Weak command and control of contingents [...] |
| 2 | The population, including victims, do not report allegations of SEA, which impacts accountability and assistance to victims. [Priority] | - Fear of reprisals; lack of understanding of UN standards of conduct regarding SEA;<br>- Insufficient awareness on how to report SEA;<br>- Skepticism that reporting will bring positive result; concerns about stigma and shame [...] |
| 3 | Civilian/uniformed personnel experience unwelcome conduct of sexual nature (inappropriate sexually suggestive jokes and gestures, intrusion in their premises at night, etc.) from uniformed or civilian peers. [Priority] | - Lack of awareness of what might constitute sexual harassment, and lack of knowledge regarding the existing reporting mechanisms, as well as formal/informal resolution methods;<br>- Cultural acceptance of status and power imbalances between genders;<br>- Weak command and control of the contingents (uniformed);<br>- Failure by managers to ensure a harmonious work environment free from sexual harassment (civilian)<br>- Failure to take early action to address possible sexual harassment within the workplace (civilian and uniformed)<br>- Limited interaction between uniformed personnel and other mission components (isolation, lack of oversight, etc.) [...] |

DEPARTMENT OF
MANAGEMENT STRATEGY,
POLICY AND COMPLIANCE

# STEP 2 - ASSESS RISKS

- Assess the likelihood of each risk occurring.
- Assess the impact of each risk on an objective.
- Assess the effectiveness of internal controls for each risk.
- Assess the severity of the residual risk, after internal controls have been applied.
- Prioritize risks and identify which risks should be the focus of the mission's attention.
- At the end of **Step 2** your risk register will have: **likelihood**, **impact**, **effectiveness internal controls** and **severity** residual risks. Risks will also be prioritized.

## STEP 2: RISK REGISTER COLUMNS

| Risk Id | … | Likelihood | Impact | Effectiveness internal controls | Severity residual risk (after internal controls) |
|---------|-----|------------|--------|---------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|
| 1 | […] | Imminent (5) | Critical (5) | Significant improvement needed (3) | Very High |
| 2 | […] | Highly likely (4) | Significant (4) | Limited improvement needed (4) | High |
| 3 | […] | Imminent (5) | Significant (4) | Limited Improvement Needed (4) | High |

## STEP 3: TREAT RISKS

- Identify measures to respond to each risk.
- Assign an action owner and due date to each risk response.
- At the end of Step 3 your risk register will include **risk response**, **action owner** and **due date** for each risk response.

### STEP 3: RISK REGISTER COLUMNS

| Risk ID | … | Risk response | Action owner | Due date & Next step(s) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | [...] | (i) Pre-deployment visits to high-risk T/PCCs to strengthen pre-deployment training on SEA (ii) More frequent SEA risk assessment visits to higher risk locations and follow-up on resulting recommendations and provision of findings to senior leadership (iii) More frequent oversight visits by Mission leadership to remote locations | (i) CDT (ii) CDT (iii) Force Commander/Police Commissioner | (i) Quarter 1(Q1): Visit to [Member State] by end August 2023 (ii): Q1: focus in remote locations areas (iii): Q1: focus on all places with presence of military contingent |
| 2 | [...] | Enhance training, including for commanders, on standards of conduct regarding sexual abuse of children (under 18 years old). ii) Increased monitoring of bases to ensure children do not congregate around bases; iii) improve perimeter fencing and security to ensure personnel cannot communicate with children through perimiter. | CDT/ DMS | Q1 |
| 3 | [...] | (i) Ensure dedicated training on sexual harassment; (ii) Sensitize managers on bystander techniques; Increase and diversify socialization and welfare opportunities, to build stronger interpersonal relations within teams and entities ; (iii) Enhanced accountability and performance assessment of commanders and managers in their management and reporting of possible cases. | CDT to lead with IMTC Force and Police | (i) Q1: Training of all incoming staff at mission HQ. Q2 and Q3: Expand to other mission sites. (ii): All year long, start with HQ and expand to more remote locations. (iii): All year long, all mission sites. |

**The misconduct/SEA risk register is now complete and ready to use.**

# COMPLETE RISK REGISTER

DEPARTMENT OF
MANAGEMENT STRATEGY,
POLICY AND COMPLIANCE

| ID | Risk & its consequence(s) | Risk factors (causes of the risk) | Likelihood | Impact | Effectiveness of internal controls | Severity residual risk | Risk reponses | Action owner | Due date and next step(s) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Military and police contingent personnel engage in SEA [Priority] | • High prevalence of bars/hotels in areas close to UN camps; • Cultural attitudes of the population that tolerate or condone transactional sex; • Weak command and control of contingents […] | Imminent (5) | Critical (5) | Significant improvement needed (3) | Very High | • (i) Pre-deployment visits to high-risk T/PCCs to strengthen pre-deployment training on SEA • (ii) More frequent SEA risk assessment visits to higher risk locations and follow-up on resulting recommendations and provision of findings to senior leadership • (iii) More frequent oversight visits by Mission leadership to remote locations | (i) CDT (ii) CDT (iii) Force Commander/Police Commissioner | (i) Quarter 1(Q1): Visit to [Member State] by end August 2023 (ii): Q1: focus in remote locations areas (iii): Q1: focus on all places with presence of military contingent |
| 2 | The population, including victims, do not report allegations of SEA, which impacts accountability and assistance to victims. [Priority] | • Fear of reprisals; lack of understanding of UN standards of conduct regarding SEA; • Insufficient awareness on how to report SEA; • Skepticism that reporting will bring positive result; concerns about stigma and shame […] | Highly likely (4) | Significant (4) | Limited improvement needed (4) | High | • Enhance training, including for commanders, on standards of conduct regarding sexual abuse of children (under 18 years old). ii) Increased monitoring of bases to ensure children do not congregate around bases; iii) improve perimeter fencing and security to ensure personnel cannot communicate with children through perimeter. | CDT/ DMS | Q1: |
| 3 | Civilian/uniformed personnel experience unwelcome conduct of sexual nature (inappropriate sexually suggestive jokes and gestures, intrusion in their premises at night, etc.) from uniformed or civilian peers. [Priority] | • Lack of awareness of what might constitute sexual harassment, and lack of knowledge regarding the existing reporting mechanisms, as well as formal/informal resolution methods; • Cultural acceptance of status and power imbalances between genders; • Weak command and control of the contingents (uniformed); • Failure by managers to ensure a harmonious work environment free from sexual harassment (civilian) • Failure to take early action to address possible sexual harassment within the workplace (civilian and uniformed) • Limited interaction between uniformed personnel and other mission components (isolation, lack of oversight, etc.) […] | Imminent (5) | Significant (4) | Limited improvement needed (4) | High | • (i) Ensure dedicated training on sexual harassment; (ii) Sensitize managers on bystander techniques; Increase and diversify socialization and welfare opportunities, to build stronger interpersonal relations within teams and entities ; (iii) Enhanced accountability and performance assessment of commanders and managers in their management and reporting of possible cases. | CDT to lead with IMTC Force and Police | (i) Q1: Training of all incoming staff at mission HQ. Q2 and Q3: Expand to other mission sites. (ii): All year long, start with HQ and expand to more remote locations. (iii): All year long, all mission sites. |

DEPARTMENT OF
**MANAGEMENT STRATEGY,
POLICY AND COMPLIANCE**

# SAMPLE MISCONDUCT RISK PROFILE

| Risk ID | Risk and its consequences | Risk factors | Mission(s) | Likelihood | Impact | Effectiveness internal controls | Severi -ty |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Sexual harassment in the workplace by civilians resulting in psychological harm to victims, security threats to victims and perpetrators, a toxic work environment and reputational damage to the UN Field Mission/Office [Priority] | • Attitudes of UN civilian personnel that tolerate or condone sexual harassment • Lack of understanding of UN personnel as to what behaviour constitutes sexual harassment • Sense of impunity among UN personnel • Weak tone at the top from leadership, managers and commanders which results in a permissive environment for such misconduct to occur • Poor gender balance • Excessive drinking at Mission's social centres contributes to inappropriate behaviour targeted at female personnel | All but particularly Mission A and B | Likely (3) | Signific ant (4) | Limited improvement needed (4) | Very High |
| 2 | Entitlement fraud (e.g. false medical insurance claims) and falsification of Personal History Forms (PHPs), resulting in financial loss and reputational damage to the UN Field Mission [Priority] | • Staff who are under financial pressure in their private lives falsify medical insurance claims to gain money; • High levels of unemployment in countries A and B create an incentive for national staff applicants to misrepresent their qualifications in their PHPs or deny that a relative is employed in the UN in order to appear more competitive; • Fear of downsizing in Mission A leads to unethical behaviour and decreased adherence to staff rules and regulations. | Mission A and B | Highly likely (4) | High (3) | Significant improvement needed (3) | Modera -te |

## SAMPLE MISCONDUCT RISK PROFILE

| Risk ID | Risk and its consequences | Risk factors | Mission(s) | Likelihood | Impact | Effectiveness internal controls | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | Drunk driving and other alcohol-related offences by personnel, resulting in possible traffic accidents, including injury or death and/or other forms of misconduct, including physical assault and sexual harassment [Priority] | • Cultural attitudes of UN personnel that tolerate or condone drunk driving, including peer pressure from UN colleagues to drive while drunk<br>• Easy access to alcohol<br>• High levels of stress due to social isolation and long rotation cycles resulting in risk-taking behaviour | Mission A, Mission B | Likely (3) | Moderate (2) | Limited improvement needed (4) | Moderate |
| 4 | Physical assault by personnel resulting in physical and psychological harm to victims, and reputational damage to the UN Field Mission [Priority] | • High levels of stress due to social isolation and long rotation cycles<br>• Attitudes of UN personnel that tolerate or condone use of physical aggression to resolve inter-personal conflict<br>• Retaliation for perceived grievances and insults in the workplace<br>• Alcohol-fueled fights between UN personnel<br>• Weak management practices that have allowed workplace grievances to go unaddressed and fester | Mission A, Mission B | Unlikely (2) | Low (1) | Limited improvement needed (4) | Low |

**DEPARTMENT OF
MANAGEMENT STRATEGY,
POLICY AND COMPLIANCE**

## SAMPLE MISCONDUCT RISK PROFILE

| Risk ID | Risk and its consequences | Risk factors | Mission(s) | Likelihood | Impact | Effectiveness internal controls | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5 | Abuse of authority and harassment by civilians, resulting in psychological harm, security threats to victims and perpetrators, a toxic work environment, higher staff absenteeism and illness, higher staff turn-over and reputational damage to the UN Field Mission/Office [Priority] | • Discriminatory attitudes about women's role in the workplace<br>• Lack of understanding of UN personnel as to what behaviour constitutes prohibited conduct under ST/SGB/2019/8<br>• Sense of impunity among UN personnel<br>• Weak tone at the top from leadership, managers and commanders resulting in a permissive environment for prohibited conduct to occur<br>• The vulnerability of staff from countries with high levels of unemployment who fear that they may lose their jobs if they reject such prohibited conduct<br>• Exploitation of the vulnerability of young, unmarried female national staff who wish to move overseas for better opportunities<br>Working and living in UN compounds in Mission A leads to a blurring of private and professional lives and contributes to inappropriate behaviour targeted at international female staff in particular | All | Likely (3) | Moderate (2) | Limited improvement needed (4) | Very High |

# SAMPLE WORKPLAN LOGFRAME

- The key tools for managing risks of misconduct/SEA are the risk register and the corresponding workplan logframe. These two tools may be sufficient in a smaller entity.
- In a larger entity, such as a peace operation, or in an entity with multiple deployment locations, it may be useful to also complete a narrative, which will reflect the contextual analysis process, and a monitoring plan.

**Background**

This workplan template describes how UN Field Missions/Offices (hereafter "missions/offices") supported by the regional conduct and discipline unit (RCDU) based in location X, will address all forms of misconduct by UN personnel in [date], including SEA, as well as manage related risks. The RCDU provides support on conduct and discipline issues to four missions/offices in the region: two special political missions (i.e. Mission A and Mission B), one traditional peacekeeping observer mission (i.e. Mission C) as well as one regional political office (i.e. Office D).

As of [date], the RCDU has four full-time staff: one Chief of Unit and one Administrative Assistant (national staff) based in the regional hub as well as one Conduct and Discipline Officer (a National Professional Officer (NPO)) based in Mission A and one Conduct and Discipline Officer (NPO) based in Mission B. In addition, there are part-time conduct and discipline focal points in the other two missions/offices (one in Mission C and one in Office D).

This workplan and related risk register was developed through a two-day workshop held on [date] in location Y with the Chief RCDU. Consultations were subsequently undertaken on [date] and [date] with missions/offices in the region, including with their conduct and discipline officers and focal points.

**Situation Analysis and Misconduct Profile**

External context, UN mandate and profile.

In [date], no significant changes are expected to mission mandates, staffing/troop levels and mission footprint from the previous year for Missions A, B and C. However, it is possible that Office D will see a change in its mandate, with a resulting increase in civilian staffing levels.   The misconduct profile is therefore expected to remain the same for all three Missions throughout [date], with a possible increase in the level of risk of misconduct in Office D should staffing levels go up.

In total, these four missions/offices have just under 2,500 personnel, of whom 88 percent are civilians (2,143 out of 2,432) and 12 percent are military (289 out of 2,432). There are no police personnel serving in the missions/offices. Mission A and Mission B are the biggest missions in the region, with over 1,000 personnel each. Mission A has essentially only civilian personnel, most of whom are national staff (74 percent). Mission B has mostly civilian personnel (78 percent), who are primarily national staff (61 percent), as well as contingent personnel (22 personnel) in the form of two guard units. Mission C is a small mission with 120 personnel, composed of similar numbers of civilians and military observers. Office D is a small office with around 30 civilian personnel, who are primarily national staff. Gender balance is poor across all the four missions/offices: women represent 12 percent of all personnel in Mission A, 20 percent of all personnel in Missions B and C, and 30 percent of all personnel in Office D4. UN personnel in each of these missions/offices are spread over a wide range of office locations: 11 locations in Mission A, six locations in Mission B, two locations in Mission C and five locations in Office D (one in each of the countries covered by the office).

**DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT STRATEGY, POLICY AND COMPLIANCE**

## Regional misconduct profile

The priority misconduct problems facing the region are:

- sexual harassment by civilians against international and national female staff in Missions A and B;
- harassment and abuse of authority, primarily by international, senior and mid-level managers against national staff across all four missions/offices;
- sexual exploitation and abuse of contracted cleaners in UN-provided accommodation in Missions A and B;
- a wide range of infractions of UN rules and regulations by international and national civilians, particularly entitlement fraud (e.g. false medical insurance claims) and falsification of personal history profiles (PHPs) in Missions A and B; and (iv) petty theft in UN offices and UN residential compounds.  Detailed information on the region's misconduct profile describes the main forms of misconduct risks facing the region, their likelihood of occurring, their expected impact on the effective implementation of mandates in the four missions/offices, the effectiveness of current internal controls to address misconduct across the four missions/offices as well as the severity of the residual risks facing the region.

As Missions A and B are the two biggest missions in the region, most allegations of misconduct relate to these two missions.  In Mission B, over the past decade or so, 46 percent of misconduct allegations have related to sexual harassment, harassment, abuse of authority and discrimination and 21 percent to infractions of UN rules and regulations. In Mission A, over the past decade or so, 32 percent of misconduct allegations have related to sexual harassment, harassment, abuse of authority and discrimination and 36 percent to infractions of UN rules and regulations. In addition, since the RCDU was established, most informal requests for advice on misconduct issues in Missions A and B have related to possible instances of sexual harassment, harassment, abuse of authority and discrimination (74 percent in Mission B and 36 percent in Mission A) and infraction of UN rules and regulations (21 percent in Mission B and 22 percent in Mission A).  A [date] survey revealed that sexual discrimination, harassment and/or violence is primarily targeted at female UN staff in country A: primarily at international female staff but also at female national staff. Allegations of sexual harassment are believed to be under-reported across all missions/offices, and particularly in Missions A and B where victims and staff, particularly women, fear reprisals if they report such allegations. Over the past decade or so, there have been four allegations of SEA (Mission A (2), Mission B (2)), none of which were substantiated.

## Results and priorities for the coming year

Results. The misconduct workplan contains 13 planned outputs (deliverables) to meet the following three outcomes:

1. Acts of misconduct by UN personnel are prevented
2. UN standards of conduct are enforced when misconduct occurs (e.g. through investigations)
3. Victims of misconduct by UN personnel are assisted

A logframe has been prepared, which contains a summary of the misconduct workplan. It includes a detailed description of the outputs, key activities to be implemented in the four missions/offices, as well as the status of implementation of the activities.

Priorities. In the coming year, the primary focus will be on addressing sexual harassment in Mission A and Mission B, followed by harassment and abuse of authority across all four missions/offices. The main approaches to tackling these problems will be through: (i) introducing of new, tailored awareness-raising materials on these forms of misconduct11; (ii) building the skills of supervisors and managers to resolve workplace grievances before they escalate into misconduct; (iii) providing informal advice to staff on how to resolve interpersonal conflict before it escalates into misconduct; (iv) creating new ways to facilitate confidential reporting of misconduct, particularly for female international and national staff.

In terms of addressing SEA, the focus will be on strengthening measures to prevent UN international civilians from engaging in SEA of contracted cleaners in UN-provided accommodation in Missions A and B, which is considered to be the most likely form that SEA might take in the region, as well as providing support to victims. Other key priorities are tackling entitlement fraud and falsification of PHPs in Missions A and B and petty theft.

**Planning assumptions and risks**

To achieve the results in the workplan, the following planning assumptions are made:

- Mission leadership, managers and commanders make it clear that addressing SEA/misconduct is a priority
- Military contingent commanders in Mission B exercise good command and control over their guard units
- Incoming personnel have been screened for a prior history of misconduct by UN Headquarters, the UN Volunteer (UNV) Programme and Member States, including for a prior record of SEA using the UN system-wide "ClearCheck" Screening Tool
- Missions A and B provide adequate welfare and recreation facilities to international civilians in the Mission area to reduce stress
- UN personnel, including victims of sexual harassment, trust in the confidentiality of the new reporting channels introduced in Mission A
- Safe, accessible reporting mechanisms exist to allow contracted cleaners to report allegations of SEA to the UN
- Adequate numbers of trained personnel are available to serve as panel members to conduct investigations into allegations of abuse of authority, harassment and discrimination under ST/SGB/2019/8 in a timely way
- Mission Conduct and Discipline Focal Points have sufficient time and resources to discharge their focal point responsibilities
- There is adequate security and logistical support to allow conduct and discipline officers to conduct workplan activities in field offices in country A and country B.

A misconduct risk register is included in the Appendix. This risk register contains the main risks to the successful achievement of the misconduct workplan, an assessment of each risk as well as information on how missions/offices will manage these risks in the coming year. There are three priority risks. These are:

- Risk 1: Sexual harassment in the workplace by international and national civilians against other civilians (as per ST/SGB/2019/8) resulting in psychological and other harm to victims, security threats to victims and perpetrators, a toxic work environment and reputational damage to the UN Field Mission/Office
- Risk 2: Abuse of authority and harassment (as per ST/SGB/2019/8) by international and national civilians against other civilians, resulting in psychological and other harm, security threats to victims and perpetrators, a toxic work environment, lower staff morale, higher staff absenteeism and illness, higher staff turn-over and reputational damage to the UN Field Mission/Office
- Risk 3: Sexual exploitation and abuse of contracted cleaners by UN international civilians in UN-provided accommodation in Missions A and B, resulting in harm to victims (psychological, physical, social), possible arrest and detention for adultery or homosexuality, security threats to the victim or perpetrator, the risk of transmission of HIV and/or STDs, and damage to the reputation and credibility of the UN Field Mission.

Regular risk assessment visits will be undertaken to identify misconduct risks, assess their severity and propose measures to mitigate them. In Mission A and Mission B, risk assessment visits to field locations are conducted by the Conduct and Discipline Officers based in those missions. In Mission C and Office D, risk assessment missions are conducted by the Chief RCDU during routine visits every six months.

**Management and coordination structures**

The regional workplan is owned by the four heads of mission/office, who are ultimately accountable for addressing misconduct, including SEA. To assist him/her in discharging this responsibility, the SEA/Misconduct Task Force in Mission A and Mission B will oversee implementation of this regional workplan and risk register in their mission areas.  In Mission C and Office D, implementation of this regional workplan and risk register will be overseen by the Senior Management Team (SMT).

**Coordination**

Implementation of this regional workplan and risk register will involve coordination with the UN Country Team (e.g. through the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General who is also the Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator in Mission A and Mission B), OIOS and Member State National Investigations Officers (NIOs) for Mission B troops, UN Headquarters, TCCs and with the Mission entities used to review the mission risk register.

**Monitoring, evaluation and learning**

Monitoring of progress towards the results described in this misconduct workplan and monitoring of risks and implementation of risk response measures will be done quarterly through the SEA/Misconduct Task Force in Mission A and Mission B, and through six-monthly meetings of the SMT in Mission C and Office D.

A monitoring plan is attached in the Appendix containing quantitative indicators to monitor progress towards the three main outcomes in the workplan as well as information on baselines, targets and data sources. Due to limited staffing in RCDU and the lower incidence of misconduct in Mission C and Office D, outcome-level monitoring will focus on the two larger missions where most incidents of misconduct occur, namely, Mission A and Mission B.  Data on the indicators will be collected quarterly by RCDU for Mission A and Mission B, and analysis presented quarterly to their respective SEA/Misconduct Task Forces. This quantitative information on progress towards results will be supplemented by qualitative information from a range of sources, including NPOs in Missions A and B and conduct and discipline focal points in Mission C and Office D, to create a more nuanced picture of how the workplan is being implemented.  Monitoring at the output level will be done in part through quarterly and yearly reporting requirements to the Conduct and Discipline Unit at UN Headquarters. Monitoring at the activity level will be done by RCDU and conduct and discipline focal points in the missions, with the aim of achieving any targets for activities set out in the logframe in Annex 2.

**Review and learning**

Towards the end of the year, the RCDU will conduct an internal rapid review of the workplan to assess the results achieved, identify good practices and lessons, as well as develop recommendations to inform the design of the next workplan. This will include conducting a trend analysis of data on misconduct allegations and cases.

During the year, any major changes to the regional workplan and risk register will be recorded in meetings of the SEA/Misconduct Task Force or SMT. The regional workplan and risk register will be formally updated once per year by the RCDU.  However, it may be updated more frequently should there be a significant change in mandate, mission profile or external context that would affect the likelihood or impact of UN personnel engaging in misconduct (e.g. if there is a significant increase in staffing in Office D).

**Resources**

This regional workplan will be implemented using staff time and other resources from all missions/offices mentioned in the logframe of this workplan (Annex 2), the staff and other resources of the RCDU office (see section 1 above) as well as part-time conduct and discipline focal points in Mission C and Office D. Many of the activities in the workplan will be implemented by the RCDU, whose core costs are paid through the Mission A and Mission B budgets, and whose travel to missions is funded through the respective mission budgets.

DEPARTMENT OF
MANAGEMENT STRATEGY,
POLICY AND COMPLIANCE

## SAMPLE MISCONDUCT WOKRPLAN LOGFRAME

| Outputs | Key activities | Mission/Office | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Output 1: All UN personnel know what are the UN standards of conduct, including on sexual harassment | 1.1 Provide induction briefing to newly-arrived personnel on conduct and discipline (indicate periodicity e.g. Entity/field operation every 6 months) | Mission A, B and C | 🟨 |
| | 1.2 Provide ST/SGB/2019/8 refresher training and/or awareness briefings to civilian personnel, including through United to Respect tool (indicate periodicity e.g. Entity/field operation every 6 months) | All | 🟥 |
| | 1.3 Managers monitor completion by civilians and experts on mission of mandatory online and classroom training on conduct and discipline issues i.e. on sexual harassment/abuse in the workplace; SEA; fraud & anti-corruption; and ethics and integrity. | All | 🟩 |
| | 1.4 Conduct internal communications activities on misconduct issues, including Head of Mission broadcasts on the duty to report misconduct (all), increased messaging to address entitlement fraud (Mission A and Mission B), and updating of Mission Conduct and Discipline Intranet sites (once per quarter) | All | 🟩 |
| Output 2: Missions/offices have adequate monitoring, oversight, coordination and other preventative mechanisms in place to address SEA and other prohibited conduct | 2.1 Conduct misconduct/SEA risk assessment visits, with support from the UN Country Team where applicable, to identify and assess misconduct risks, identify risk mitigation measures and monitor the status of their implementation (indicate periodicity e.g. Entity/field operation every 6 months) | All | 🟥 |
| | 2.2 Hold meetings of the Mission Misconduct/SEA Task Force to review implementation of the regional misconduct/SEA workplan and risk register, in coordination with PSEA Network (quarterly) | Mission A. B | 🟩 |
| | 2.3 Hold meetings with the Senior Management Team to review implementation of the regional misconduct/SEA workplan and risk register (every six months) | Mission C, Office D | 🟩 |
| | 2.4 Participate in the Prevention of SEA (PSEA) Network Meetings with the UN Country Team | Mission A, B | 🟨 |

DEPARTMENT OF
**MANAGEMENT STRATEGY,**
**POLICY AND COMPLIANCE**

## SAMPLE MISCONDUCT WOKRPLAN LOGFRAME

| Outputs | Key activities | Mission/Office | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Output 3: Missions receive, assess, process and refer in a timely manner all allegations of misconduct to OIOS/TCCs (via DMSPC) for investigation, and when necessary collect and preserve evidence of SEA or other forms of misconduct | 3.1 All allegations are assessed by the regional conduct and discipline unit and referred to OIOS or to HQ (for investigation by member states) within 3 days of receipt | All | |
| Output 4: Missions recommend administrative, interim and/or disciplinary measures in misconduct cases and implement authorised measures | 4.1 Request/recommend administrative, interim and/or disciplinary measures in misconduct cases involving civilian and military personnel, including administrative leave with or without pay and repatriation of military and police personnel on administrative grounds, and implement authorized measures | All | |

**STATUS EXPLANATION**

**On Schedule**

**Potential for Delay**

**No Progress/ Significant Delay**

**Completed**

DEPARTMENT OF
**MANAGEMENT STRATEGY,
POLICY AND COMPLIANCE**

# SAMPLE MONITORING PLAN

| No. | Indicator | Baseline [date] | Target [date] | Data source |
|-----|-----------|-----------------|---------------|-------------|
| 1 | Change in the number of requests for advice received by RCDU from UN personnel regarding potential incidents of conduct prohibited under ST/SGB/2019/8 compared to the previous year (disaggregated by type of allegation of prohibited conduct) [Comment: this refers to informal enquiries that do not constitute a formal complaint and are tracked] | X of requests for advice were received by RCDU from UN personnel regarding potential incidents of conduct prohibited under ST/SGB/2019/8 (disaggregated by type of prohibited conduct) | Increase in the number of requests for advice received by RCDU from UN personnel regarding potential incidents of conduct prohibited under ST/SGB/2019/8 compared to the previous year [Comment: Workplan activities are expected to result in increased willingness of staff to request informal advice] | RCDU non-CMTS database |
| 2 | Change in the number of PHP falsification allegations received in Missions A and B in a year compared to the previous year | X allegations of PHP falsification were received in Missions A and B as compared to the previous year (Mission A: X allegations of PHP falsification, Mission B: X allegations of PHP falsification | Increase in the number of allegations of PHP falsification received in Missions A and B in [date] compared to [date] [Comment: Workplan activities in [date] are expected to result in improved verification of PHPs and a resulting increase in allegations of this nature] | CMTS |
| 3 | Change in percentage of complaints that have been assessed by a CDT or CDFP within seven days of having been reported | X percentage of complaints were assessed by a CDT or CDFP within seven days of having been reported compared to the percentage in the previous year | Increase in the percentage complaints that were assessed by a CDT or CDFP within seven days of having been reported compared to the percentage in the previous year | CMTS |
| 4 | Change in percentage of allegations referred to the appropriate investigative body in the mission, or to OIOS or to HQ (for investigation by member states) within 3 days | X percent of allegations referred to the appropriate investigative body in the mission, or to OIOS or to HQ (for investigation by member states) within 3 days | Increase in the percent of allegations referred to the appropriate investigative body in the mission, or to OIOS or to HQ (for investigation by member states) within 3 days | Non-CMTS tracking |

DEPARTMENT OF
**MANAGEMENT STRATEGY,
POLICY AND COMPLIANCE**

# LEADERSHIP CHECKLIST

## LEADING BY EXAMPLE

- ☐ The SRSG and DSRSG/HC/RC and other senior UN officials **address misconduct, including a focus on SEA and sexual harassment, as part of their outreach and communications** when travelling throughout the country/mission area.

- ☐ The SRSG, DSRSG/HC/RC and mission leadership have **personally completed all mandatory training** on conduct and discipline\* and communicated this to all UN staff and related personnel in the country along with the expectation of full compliance by all relevant personnel, which is monitored on a bi-annual basis.

- ☐ The SRSG communicates to **Managers and Commanders their responsibilities** to create and foster a respectful and harmonious work environment which follows the United Nations values and code of conduct.

- ☐ Misconduct/SEA **risk management is included in the performance reviews** of Mission senior leadership.

- ☐ **Mission Leadership**, including the Force and Police, **regularly visit personnel deployed in remote areas** and address conduct and discipline, including SEA and sexual harassment, and the effect of misconduct on individuals, families and communities. These visits should be integrated with other offices if possible (including CDT, SVRO, PSEA Coordinator, CP, DSS, AFPs, etc.). Visit reports are to be consolidated to ensure corrective actions are taken.

- ☐ The SRSG and mission leadership **are available to speak to the media** on issues related to SEA and other misconduct where relevant.

## KEY LEADERSHIP STRUCTURES

- ☐ The Chief CDT, PSEA Coordinator and SVRO\*\*/VRFP are part of the **Mission Senior Leadership Team.**

- ☐ The **PSEA Taskforce/Network meets on a quarterly basis** and *ad hoc* as needed.

- ☐ **The SRSG meets, at least every two months**, with the CDT to maintain visibility on misconduct risk management broadly, and with the DSRSG/HC/RC, CDT, SVRO and PSEA Coordinator on SEA risk management.

- ☐ The Mission **actively engages with the PSEA Taskforce/Network.**

---

\* Relevant mandatory trainings are: "Prevention of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse;" "United to Respect: Preventing Sexual Harassment and Other Prohibited Conduct;" "Preventing Fraud and Corruption at the United Nations;" as well as "Ethics and Integrity at the United Nations."

\*\* As of 2023 there are SVROs in MONUSCO, MINUSCA, UNMISS and BINUH.

DEPARTMENT OF
MANAGEMENT STRATEGY,
POLICY AND COMPLIANCE

## RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK

☐ The Mission has **an integrated misconduct risk framework**\*\*\* (Framework) that was reviewed and updated within the last year with input from all relevant components, including the UNCT/HCT in relation to SEA.

☐ The Framework **includes concrete actions** to prevent, detect, report, and respond to misconduct, and realize the rights of victims of SEA and sexual harassment and provide effective support and assistance.

☐ The Framework **has field/HQ based workplans** as needed.

☐ The Framework **has a strategic communications plan**, which addresses prevention, detection, reporting and response, including how and where to report, the responsibility of 'bystanders' and the impact of SEA and sexual harassment on individuals with families and communities.

☐ The Mission and the country team (UNCT/HCT) **submit the mandatory annual SEA Action Plan to the Secretary-General**.

☐ The SRSG and the DSRSG/HC/RC ensure effective monitoring mechanisms are in place and regularly **request data driven analysis and visualizations** on reported misconduct from the Conduct and Discipline Team (CDT), and on SEA also from the PSEA Coordinator as informed by stakeholders including Senior Victims' Rights Officer (SVRO), Victims' Rights Focal Point (VRFP), Force, Police, UNDSS and OIOS.

☐ **Sufficient resources are allocated** to misconduct/SEA risk management, including around human resources (PSEA Coordinator, SVRO/VRFP), coordination, prevention, detection, reporting, response and provision of support to victims of SEA. The Mission should consider these needs **as part of annual budget exercises** and should allocate petty cash and mission support resources to support victims.

☐ The SRSG **alerts UN Headquarters in New York** to issues of concern with current deployments, as soon as they are apparent, (early warning) so that HQ can actively engage with the Member States to elevate the concerns and mitigate any potential risks.

---

\*\*\* A misconduct risk framework refers to a misconduct risk register and corresponding workplan or action plan.

DEPARTMENT OF
**MANAGEMENT STRATEGY,
POLICY AND COMPLIANCE**

# EXAMPLES OF SEXUAL HARRASSMENT RISK FACTORS

- The determination of risk factors in the risk register must be based on an integrated contextual analysis as per Step 1. The risk factors may vary based on circumstances related to the nature of the mission and deployment.
- Below are common risk factors associated with <u>sexual harassment</u>. This is not an exhaustive list but may be useful in conducting the analysis.

**Within the perpetrator's / victim's environment**
- Lengthy deployments without regular family/community contact and support
- Association with work environment that tolerates sexually explicit attitudes (e.g. jokes, posters, images/videos on work computers)
- Association with office/unit that has a history of reports of sexual harassment and/or sexual exploitation and abuse
- Exposure to sexually explicit media
- Excessive use of alcohol or substance (reduce inhibitions)

**Within the work environment**
- Lack of regular monitoring/oversight and accountability by senior leadership and command
- Gender imbalance (in number and in level of responsibility)
- Strong peer pressure not to question or disrupt the existing codes and structures (conservative/hierarchical environments)
- Peer pressure to join group behaviour that creates an environment that enables sexual harassment
- Poor command and control (uniformed entities) or weak managerial supervision
- Unwillingness by bystanders to speak up and/or report possible sexual harassment
- Different levels of preparedness and training of uniformed components on sexual harassment
- Lack of employment opportunities (victim might feel compelled to tolerate inappropriate behavior)
- Lack of knowledge of policies, processes and support options
- Underreporting due to lack of trust in institutional responses related to sexual harassment, sexual violence and gender equity

# KEY QUESTIONS FOR SEA SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS

This tool contains a list of key questions to guide situational analysis and identify SEA-related risks and risk factors. This tool can be used as part of step 1 when looking specifically at risks of SEA.

## 1. External context

- Does the country context present opportunities for UN personnel to commit SEA?  (e.g. the existence of a legal and/or open commercial sex industry; high proportion of the population living in poverty or unemployed; cultural tolerance of exchange of money or gifts for sex between consenting adults; cultural practice of early child marriage; a weak rule of law system that is unlikely to be able to hold UN personnel to account for criminal acts)
- How do the opportunities for UN personnel to commit SEA differ in the capital compared to field locations? Are there significant regional differences in the context?
- What opportunities exist for UN personnel to commit SEA in rest and recuperation (R&R) locations? How easily can acts of SEA be detected in R&R locations?
- Who in the population is most vulnerable to SEA by UN personnel? (e.g. domestic workers, teenage school girls, street children, migrant workers in bars and restaurants, populations fleeing conflict who settle around UN bases in search of protection, internally displaced persons (IDPs) living in camps protected by UN peacekeepers)
- What does trend analysis of past UN data on victims reveal about who is most vulnerable to SEA by UN personnel?
- Are UN personnel being approached by the local population and solicited for sex? (e.g. UN personnel are targeted by commercial sex workers in hotel bars or clubs)
- How likely are victims and the local population to report SEA allegations? Could this change as the mission downsizes or withdraws? (e.g. cultural tolerance of exchange of sex for money or gift between consenting adults may discourage reporting of SEA; socially-conservative attitudes about extra-marital sex may discourage reporting of SEA; countries where homosexuality is illegal would discourage reporting of SEA involving boys/men; there may be fewer reporting channels as the mission downsizes)
- What are the likely consequences for children born as a result of SEA by UN personnel? (e.g. social stigma, difficulty to obtain a birth certificate when paternity in unknown, poor access to education, food and health services)

## 2. UN Secretariat entity mandate and profile

### UN Secretariat entity mandate

- Does mandate implementation require extensive contact with populations that are vulnerable to SEA by UN personnel? Which categories of personnel or components of the mission are most in contact with such vulnerable populations?
- Does mandate implementation involve deployments to remote locations where there is limited external oversight of UN personnel?

### UN Secretariat entity profile

- What is the overall composition of the UN Secretariat entity? Which components have the largest numbers of personnel?
- Is it a family or non-family duty station? How does this affect the organizational culture of the UN Secretariat entity?
- What is the gender balance among UN personnel? How does this affect the organizational culture of the UN Secretariat entity?
- Do specific categories of personnel have a culture of excessive drinking and/or risk taking (which have been associated factors in some past cases of SEA)?
- What does trend analysis of past UN data on SEA allegations and cases reveal about which UN personnel are more likely to commit SEA in the future and under what circumstances? (i.e. data on what has happened in the past can give a good indication of what is likely to happen in the future)

- Where there have been SEA allegations against contingent personnel in the past, what measures have been taken by those Member States to reduce the likelihood of future incidents?
- What does analysis of past SEA investigations reveal about what challenges are likely to arise in future SEA investigations?
- Are resources to investigate allegations of SEA adequate?

## 3. UN Secretariat entity commitment to addressing SEA

- What is the tone at the top among the leadership about the importance of addressing SEA?
- To what extent do leadership, managers and commanders lead by example and demonstrate through their personal behaviour and through their actions in the workplace a commitment to addressing SEA?

## 4. Knowledge and attitudes of UN personnel

- To what extent do UN personnel know what are the UN standards of conduct on SEA? (e.g. whether contingents received adequate pre-deployment training on SEA; whether re-hatted troops received training on SEA; whether mandatory SEA training was completed on arrival in the mission).
- To what extent do UN personnel accept the UN standards of conduct on SEA?  (e.g. are the standards perceived as an unacceptable intrusion into their private lives).
- To what extent do UN personnel hold attitudes that tolerate or condone certain forms of SEA? (e.g. sex with commercial sex workers or early child marriage).

## 5. Access to the local population

### Location of accommodation/camps

- Do the living arrangements of UN personnel and the location of UN camps present opportunities for UN personnel to commit SEA? (e.g. lax hotel policies on overnight guests, the hiring of domestic workers by civilians, and the close proximity of UN contingent camps to residential areas, schools or market stalls could all present opportunities for SEA)

### Security situation

- To what extent does the security situation affect the ability of UN international personnel and contingent personnel to move around and have contact with the population? How will this evolve over the coming months?
- Are there lists of out-of-bounds locations? Are there adequate resources to patrol these locations? (e.g. by UN military police) How easily can off-duty UN personnel be distinguished from the population?
- Do mission-specific policies exist that restrict UN personnel movements and/or off-duty contact with the population? (e.g. curfews, non-fraternisation policies for uniformed personnel)

### Camp security and security arrangements

- To what extent can contingent personnel leave their camps undetected? Is camp security adequate? (e.g. perimeter fencing and lighting, entry/exit controls)
- To what extent can the local population enter UN camps, offices and private accommodation undetected?

## 6. Living and deployment conditions

- Is welfare provision for civilian, military and police personnel adequate?
- Are any contingents being deployed without leave or R&R breaks for more than twelve months?
- Do specific categories of personnel stay in the mission for their R&R breaks to save money?
- Is it common practice for specific components to avoid taking annual leave or R&R due to the high tempo of work/operations?
- Are the living conditions for civilian, military and police personnel adequate?

**DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT STRATEGY, POLICY AND COMPLIANCE**

# EXAMPLES OF SEA INTERNAL CONTROLS

This tool will help identify the internal controls that are already in place to address the risks of SEA, assess their effectiveness and understand the severity of the residual risks (Step 2). Step 3 will determine how to treat the residual risks.

## Objective 1: Prevention

### Awareness-raising and training

1. Measures to increase knowledge of UN personnel on UN standards of conduct on SEA and how to report SEA (e.g. through induction and refresher training; internal communications activities via townhalls, the Mission intranet etc.; requirement for experts on mission and contingent commanders to sign a confirmation letter acknowledging that they understand the UN standards of conduct and will fulfill their responsibilities in this regard).
2. Measures to create an organizational culture that is respectful of both women and men (e.g. provision of gender awareness training, messaging from Mission leadership, regular dialogue between mission headquarters and female staff deployed to remote locations with poor gender balance).

### Accountability, structures and policies

1. A clear tone at the top underlining the importance of addressing SEA and the importance of UN core values (e.g. issuance of a Head of Mission vision statement on SEA; inclusion of SEA as an agenda topic in management meetings and commander conferences).
2. Dedicated structures and resources to address SEA (e.g. conduct and discipline experts or focal points, Standing SEA Task Force, networks of SEA focal points, Immediate Response Teams (IRT) to collect and safeguard SEA evidence in the immediate aftermath of an SEA allegations being received).
3. Inclusion of language on addressing SEA in senior leadership Compacts and in the performance appraisals of managers and commanders and other staff.
4. Mission-specific policies and procedures that restrict UN personnel movements and off-duty contact with the local population (e.g. curfews, lists of out-of-bounds areas where prostitution is known or suspected to occur, non-fraternization policy for uniformed personnel, policy on wearing of uniform at all times within the Mission area (except when on leave), requirement for contingents to move in supervised groups when off-duty, ban on use of domestic workers from the population in UN contingent camps; policy prohibiting certain categories of contractor personnel (e.g. cleaners) being in UN compounds after working hours or at weekends).
5. Measures to restrict access of the population to UN accommodation/camps of civilian and uniformed personnel (e.g. restrict the timings when cleaners can be in UN camps to minimize contact with UN staff, liaise with the local authorities to prevent new businesses/dwellings from being erected adjacent to UN contingent camps).
6. Monitoring and oversight of high-risk locations for SEA (e.g. SEA risk assessment visits, deployment of conduct and discipline experts to high-risk areas, regular visits by senior military commanders to high-risk locations).

### Safety and security

- Strengthening perimeter security of UN military camps to prevent unauthorized absences of contingent members and unauthorized persons from entering camps.
- Strengthening entry/exit controls into UN camps/offices/accommodation blocks.

## Welfare and living conditions

1. Provision of adequate welfare facilities (e.g. internet, phone/skype, gym, outdoor sports, indoor games, supervised outings, UN welfare flights, inter-contingent sporting competitions, provision of PX facilities, food deliveries to remote locations) and adequate living conditions for civilian, military and police personnel.
2. Provision of counselling services for civilian, military and police personnel.
3. Design of contingent camps and UN premises to minimize off-duty contact with the population (e.g. by including space to play outdoor games/sports inside the camp/premises; by locating contingent camps away from existing residential areas and markets).
4. Channeling personal, charitable donations from UN personnel (e.g. food and non-food items) through third party organizations such as non-governmental organizations.

# Objective 2: Enforcement

1. Establishment of complaint mechanisms for UN personnel and the local population to increase reporting of SEA (e.g. toll-free telephone hotline, complaint boxes in offices and outside contingent camps, CBCMs).
2. Patrolling curfews and out-of-bounds locations (e.g. using UN Military Police).
3. Use of Immediate Response Teams (IRT) to collect and safeguard SEA evidence.
4. External communications, in coordination with CDS/DMSPC, on the status and outcome of SEA investigations.

# Objective 3: Victims' Assistance

## Awareness-raising and communications

1. External communications activities targeting the population on risk factors for SEA, UN standards of conduct on SEA, reporting mechanisms for the population, and assistance available to victims and children born as a result of SEA. This should be done in coordination with other mission components, local authorities and civil society (e.g. traditional leaders, youth and women groups). Examples of communications activities include: radio programmes, community theatre and dance, distribution of t-shirts/umbrellas/hats with SEA messaging, pocket cards in local languages on how to report SEA).

## Immediate and longer-term assistance

1. Establishment of referral mechanisms for victims of SEA so that victims are provided with immediate support (e.g. psycho-social assistance, shelter, security/protection) and longer-term support (e.g. skills training, support to return to full-time education).
2. Measures to facilitate paternity claims and child support claims for children born as a result of SEA by UN personnel (e.g. provision of free DNA testing by the Mission to establish paternity, follow-up with TCCs and PCCs through UN Headquarters).
3. Establishment of victim rights focal points in entities to maintain contact with victims and assist them in realizing their rights.

## Follow-up with Member States

1. Follow up with Member States, via UN Headquarters, on the status and outcome of SEA cases and paternity and child support claims.

**DEPARTMENT OF
MANAGEMENT STRATEGY,
POLICY AND COMPLIANCE**

# EXAMPLES OF SEA RISK FACTORS

- The determination of risk factors in the risk register must be based on an integrated contextual analysis as per Step 1. The risk factors may vary based on circumstances related to the nature of the mission and deployment.
- Below are common risk factors associated with SEA. This is not an exhaustive list but may be useful in conducting the analysis.

---

- High prevalence of bars/hotels/brothels in areas close to UN contingent camps;
- Poor UN camp perimeter security and weak entry/exit controls;
- Presence of children in areas close to UN camps/compounds;
- Cultural attitudes of the population that tolerate or condone transactional sex;
- Opportunities for UN personnel to interact with children while gathering water/supplies;
- Low awareness that UN standards consider sexual activity with anyone under 18 years old to be sexual abuse regardless of age of consent nationally; Cultural attitudes that tolerate child marriage;
- Personnel do not abide by curfews and off-limits locations;
- Low awareness of specific contingents of UN standards of conduct on SEA on arrival in the mission;
- Weak command and control of contingents;
- Entitlement to rest and recuperation (R&R and annual leave) not exercised;
- Single nation deployments to remote locations;
- Deployment of personnel who speaks the local language increases the ability to fraternize with the population when off-duty, in violation of the mission-specific non-fraternization policy for uniformed personnel;
- Information in VATS is not kept up to date;
- Poor road infrastructure making travel to health and other services difficult;
- Victims decline assistance offered by the UN or there is no appropriate assistance available;
- Local authorities are often unwilling to issue children born as a result of SEA with a birth certificate if the name of the father is unknown, making school registration and other long-term assistance difficult;
- Limited resources within mission area for welfare and recreational activities (e.g. internet connectivity);
- Physical evidence has been contaminated or destroyed due to delays in the arrival of the TCC/UN investigators;
- Victims/witnesses refuse to collaborate with the investigation;
- Perpetrators use a false identity, or victims otherwise do not know the identity of the perpetrator, thereby making identification of the perpetrator difficult/impossible;
- Victims/witnesses are interviewed multiple times adding to their trauma, their willingness to participate in the investigation and eroding the quality of the evidence;
- Perpetrator attempts to interfere with the investigation (e.g. persuading victim not to participate in investigation);
- Victim reports emerged considerably later after the incident occurred, posing challenges in gathering evidence and recalling details from memory;
- Investigators do not have specialist skills in conducting sexual violence investigations resulting in poor quality of evidence gathered and potentially increased harm to victims and witnesses;
- Victims change phone numbers; move around a lot and are unable to be located after reporting SEA;
- NIOs do not have specialist skills in conducting sexual violence investigations resulting in poor quality of evidence gathered and potentially increased harm to victims and witnesses;
- Lack of uniform standards for SEA investigations involving UN personnel;

# EXAMPLES OF RISK RESPONSES TO SEA

- The determination of risk factors in the risk register must be based on an integrated contextual analysis as per Step 1. The risk factors may vary based on circumstances related to the nature of the mission and deployment.
- Below are common risk responses associated with SEA. This is not an exhaustive list but may be useful in conducting the analysis.

---

- Pre-deployment advisory visits to TCC and PCC to strengthen quality of pre-deployment training on SEA;
- More frequent SEA risk assessment visits to higher risk locations and early warnings to senior leadership;
- More frequent visits to remote locations where a single nation is deployed;
- More frequent oversight visits by Mission leadership to higher risk locations;
- Expand CBCMs and networks of Community Focal Points to cover new higher risk locations;
- Increase awareness raising activities by CBCMs;
- Access control measures are in place and operational at entrances consistently;
- Ensure an ID badge system for visitors is in place and visitors are accompanied from entrances/reception points by inviting staff members;
- Strengthening liaison between the Mission and local authorities to close down/relocate bars/hotels/brothels in walking distance to camps;
- Ensure outreach to mission/entity personnel (e.g. training, poster campaigns, messaging from commanders) indicating that sexual activity with anyone under 18 years is sexual abuse under UN standards of conduct regardless of age of sexual consent;
- Ensure that children are not permitted to loiter close to the base/camps;
- Training for the Mission's Immediate Response Team (IRT) on how to collect and safeguard evidence of SEA in the immediate aftermath of an allegation and pending the arrival on the ground of TCC/UN investigators;
- Victim Assistance Tracking System (VATS) is kept up to date;
- Victims are contacted periodically to inform them of any updates and to ensure contact information is correct;
- Ensure proper training of National Investigation Officers (NIOs) in the victim-centred approach;
- Coordinate with SVRO, where available, and PSEA Network members on integrated SEA risk management country-wide, including on the annual SEA action plan;
- Adequate resources for recreational activities within mission area;
- Managers and commanders support personnel in availing themselves of entitlement to rest and recuperation;
- Ensure effective communication strategies for coordinated messaging and transparency.